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The role of trade sanctions in enforcing greenhouse gas mitigation agreements is the 
fundamental theme of the three essays comprising this dissertation. All three essays 
employ a multi-sector, multi-region computable general equilibrium model, GTAP-AEZ-
GHG, documented in Golub et al. (2009) to investigate how the United States can use 
trade sanctions as an enforcement mechanism in a global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
mitigation agreement. The focus is placed on inducing China to comply with the global 
agreement. 
The first essay contributes to the body of knowledge on global GHG emissions 
mitigation agreements by investigating the range of emission taxes that can be enforced 
successfully through punitive tariffs (used by the U.S. against China). The results suggest 
that the ability of punitive tariffs to enforce a multilateral environmental agreement may 
be substantial. However, the set of credible and effective threats shrinks as the emission 
tax increases from 0 to $38/TCE, and becomes null afterwards. Therefore, there is a 
trade-off between the targeted abatement level and the viability of punitive tariffs as an 




 The second essay investigates the economic and environmental performance of 
emission-based Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs) in agricultural sectors. The analysis 
shows that emission-based BTAs are helpful in controlling emissions leakage but not on 
the loss of competitiveness in agricultural sectors. It is also observed that the results 
about the assessment of impacts of BTAs on emissions leakage are quite sensitive to the 
method used to measure the emission content of products. Ignoring indirect emissions in 
a production chain leads to underestimation of emission content of products which as a 
result leads to underestimation of effectiveness of BTAs. 
 The final essay brings the understanding having been developed in Essays 1 and 2 
together and investigates the viability of emission-based BTAs as an enforcement 
mechanism used by the U.S. against China in global GHG mitigation agreements. It is 
found that as long as global emission tax does not exceed $21.50/TCE threshold, and 
there is no legal constraints imposed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) it is 
possible for the U.S. to find a viable BTA level to induce China to take the same 
abatement measures. However, when GATT is followed and damage of pollution is not 
taken into account, the set of viable BTA threats is empty. Comparison of this result with 
the findings of the first essay of this dissertation suggests that, by providing a wider range 
of viable emission tax, punitive tariffs provide more stability to a global GHG mitigation 
agreement than emission-based BTAs. It is also observed that the maximum enforceable 
emissions tax (MET) increases as the marginal damage from pollution increases. For 
instance, increase in marginal cost of pollution from $0 to $5/TCE increases MET by $8 




CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW 
According to Nordhaus (1991) global warming is a direct result of human 
activities. Cooperation between nations is required to fight the problem. The Kyoto 
Protocol (1997) was the first attempt to reach this cooperation between countries and start 
the reduction in the GHG emissions. The Kyoto protocol obligated the developed 
countries (Annex I countries) to start controlling their GHG emissions in 2008 and 
achieve targeted abatement by 2012. For the developing countries (non-Annex I 
countries), on the other hand, the protocol did not set any obligations but let them abate 
their emissions voluntarily. 
The major accomplishment of the Kyoto Protocol was to increase awareness to 
the global warming problem. Although, the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol expired in 2012 without achieving a global consensus between countries (only 
83 out of out of 192 parties ratified the protocol), there are invaluable lessons we can take 
from this first attempt. For instance, as Barrett (2003) posited, the lack of enforcement 
mechanism within the Kyoto protocol as a central reason of its ineffectiveness. The initial 
focus of the protocol was to determine which countries would abate and what the size of 
the emission reductions would be. However, the question of how those goals would be 
reached was not addressed in the initial version of the protocol. An answer to that 
question has been suggested by including reward type of enforcement 
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mechanisms in later versions of the protocol. However, Barrett (2003) states that lack of 
enforcement mechanism in the initial version affected overall success of the protocol. 
If Barrett’s advice is taken, a new global GHG mitigation agreement should 
definitely include some kind of enforcement mechanism in its structure. Moreover, to 
achieve global emissions reductions sufficient to stabilize CO2 concentration this new 
agreement should be signed and ratified by China and the United States, the two largest 
emitters of global human related GHG emissions (Leggett, 2011) responsible for almost 
40% of the global GHG emissions (21% by China and 19% by the U.S.). This fact makes 
these two nations the most important players of this public-good type climate change 
game. Fortunately, unlike the standard public good game in which the only link between 
the players is provision of the public good and hence the optimal strategy of that game is 
always to free ride, in the climate change game the two players/nations, i.e., China and 
the U.S., are linked to each other not only through the Earth’s atmosphere they live in but 
also through the international trade markets they participate. This second link between 
the two players makes international trade barriers such as punitive tariffs and Border Tax 
Adjustment (BTA) perfect candidates for enforcement mechanisms.  
All three essays in this dissertation employ a multi-sector, multi-region 
computable general equilibrium model, GTAP-AEZ-GHG, documented in Golub et al. 
(2009). The results reported in this dissertation are obtained using the GEMPACK 
economic modeling software (Harrison and Pearson, 1996). The main assumption made 
in this dissertation is that at the beginning of the abatement game, the U.S. and rest of the 
World (ROW) are voluntarily controlling their emissions while China is free riding. In 
other words, there is no initially exogenous inducement on the U.S. or ROW. Under such 
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assumption, the main questions answered in this dissertation are that: 1) under what 
conditions does the U.S. have incentives to threaten China with trade barriers to induce 
China to comply with the agreement? 2) Under what conditions does China have 
incentives to comply with the agreement instead of free-riding and receiving trade 
barriers from the U.S.? 
Chapter 2 answers these questions when punitive tariffs are the trade barriers the 
U.S. considers to use against China’s free-ride. The results show that as long as global 
emission price does not exceed $38 per tons of carbon (C )equivalent (TCE) threshold it 
is always possible for the U.S. to find some punitive tariff level at which 1) the U.S. is 
willing to implement the trade barrier to Chinese imports to induce China to join the U.S. 
and the rest of the World in GHG abatement (Credibility Condition), and 2) China is 
willing to comply with the global GHG mitigation agreement instead of free-riding but 
receiving the U.S.’s punitive tariffs (Effectiveness Condition). 
Chapter 2 also clarifies some confusion in the literature regarding terminology. 
The first issue is related to the “credibility” of an inducement (or threat) for which 
changes in the U.S. welfare can be used to provide an answer. The second issue, on the 
other hand, is about the “effectiveness” of an inducement/threat for which welfare 
changes of China can be used to provide an answer.  
Changing focus, Chapter 3, explores effects of emission-based Border Tax 
Adjustments (BTAs) on emission leakage, competitiveness loss and regional and global 
welfare changes in agricultural sectors. The role of BTAs in the context of agriculture has 
received less attention in the literature compared with that in manufacturing sectors. It is 
mainly because of the existing studies considering only CO2 emissions but ignoring the 
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other greenhouse gases such as methane and nitrous oxide. While agriculture plays a 
small role in CO2 combustion emissions, it is much more important in the context of the 
hitherto under-emphasized, non-CO2 emissions, including methane and nitrous oxide. 
BTAs are tariffs on emissions embodied in imports coming from countries which 
are not controlling their emissions. Therefore, it is very important how accurate emissions 
embodied in imports are calculated. For that purpose, Chapter 3 tests the sensitivity of the 
BTA impacts to alternative methods for calculating the emission embodied in a product. 
The results show that BTAs have some impact on controlling emission leakage but not on 
recovering competitiveness losses in agricultural sectors. It is also found that these results 
are sensitive to method chosen to calculate the emissions embodied in imports. Ignoring 
indirect emissions leads to underestimating emission content of products and results in 
smaller impact of emission-based BTAs on emission leakage in agricultural and other 
sectors in non-abating regions. 
Finally, Chapter 4 brings the methods developed in Chapters 2 and 3 together and 
investigates how the U.S. can use emission-based BTAs as an enforcement mechanism in 
a GHG mitigation agreement to induce China to comply with a global agreement. The 
results show that as long as global emission price does not exceed a threshold of $21.50 
per tons of carbon equivalent (TCE), it is always possible for the U.S. to find some BTA 
level at which, 1) the U.S. is willing to implement the BTA on Chinese imports, and 2) 
China is willing to comply with the global GHG mitigation agreement instead of free-
riding and receiving the U.S.’s BTA. It is also observed that the maximum enforceable 
emissions tax (MET) increases as the marginal damage from pollution increases. For 
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instance, $5/TCE increase in marginal cost of pollution from $0 to $5/TCE increases 
MET by $8 (from $21.50/TCE to $30/TCE).  
As enforcement mechanisms, the performance of punitive tariffs and BTAs are 
compared also in Chapter 4. The comparison results show that when marginal damage 
from pollution is $10/TCE, punitive tariffs provide larger range of emissions taxes 
($60/TCE) than BTAs ($40/TCE). Therefore, punitive tariffs are more stable deterrents 
for China’s free-riding used by the U.S. in a global GHG mitigation agreement. This is an 
interesting result considering that it is still an actively debated issue whether punitive 
tariffs can be used as an enforcement mechanism as some consider punitive tariffs to be 
conflicting with the current WTO regulations.  
Regarding the methodologies of Chapters 2 and 4, unlike Chapter 2, benefits of 
abatement are taken into account in Chapter 4. Because in Chapter 4, it is found that if a 
strict implementation of GATT’s rules and regulations is followed and damage of 
pollution is ignored, the set of viable BTA threats is empty. To be able to find a non-
empty set of viable BTA threats benefits of abatement needs to be taken into account. 
However, the estimates of marginal damage of pollution in the literature vary widely 
(Nordhaus, 2011). Therefore, a non-zero lower bound of the maximum enforcement 
emission tax in BTA case is investigated for three cases: when marginal damage of 
pollution equals $5/TCE, $10/TCE or $15/TCE. In Chapter 2, on the other hand, 
conceptually there is no equality condition between the change in the power of tariff rate 
and the level of emission tax. Therefore, Chapter 2 ignores the damage of pollution and 
provides only a lower bound for the effectiveness condition, an upper bound of the 
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credibility conditions, and thus a lower bound of the maximum enforcement emissions 
tax.  
This dissertation incorporates insights from game theory to the investigation of 
the interaction between global trade and GHG mitigation agreements which guarantees 
consistency of policy decisions with incentive compatibility conditions under strategic 
behavior. If the set of credible and effective threats is empty, trade sanctions can be ruled 
out an enforcement mechanism regardless of legal or political viability. Ignoring strategic 
behavior (through game theory) may fail to identify these limitations of trade sanctions. 
For example an analysis that ignores strategic behavior may find that a threat of trade 
sanctions could induce cooperation when such threat is not credible. This would tend to 





CHAPTER 2.  CAN UNITED STATES CONVINCE CHINA TO COMPLY WITH A 
GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION AGREEMENT BY USING 
PUNITIVE TARIFFS: A CASE STUDY 
2.1 Introduction 
The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol expired in 2012 without 
achieving its goal of limiting overall greenhouse gas emissions in industrialized countries 
over 2008 – 2012 period. This is not surprising considering the fact that the U.S. and 
China, the two largest contributors to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Leggett, 
2011; CAIT 2011) are yet to take action aimed at curbing their GHG emissions. 
Incentives of countries to sign and comply with the Kyoto protocol are diminished by two 
central features of the agreement: 1) it exempts the non-Annex I countries1, including 
China; and, 2) it lacks an enforcement mechanism that would be effective in guaranteeing 
compliance (Owen and Hanley, 2004).  
Barrett (2003) posited the lack of enforcement mechanism within the Kyoto 
protocol as a central reason of its ineffectiveness. Since the Earth’s atmosphere is a 
global public good and GHG emissions cause trans-boundary externalities, the Kyoto 
protocol (or any other international environmental agreement designed to curb GHG 
emissions) has the structure of the well-known prisoner’s dilemma: while the social 
optimum is achieved when all countries cooperate, all of them have individual  
                                                 
1
 Non-Annex I countries are mostly developing countries that have signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol, 
but have no binding emission reduction targets. 
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incentives not to do so. If there is no enforcement mechanism that allows complying 
countries to punish free-riders (or incentivizing them to comply) then no cooperation can 
be sustained. In this essay, it is hypothesized that trade sanctions in the form of punitive 
tariffs (used by the U.S. against China) may constitute a viable enforcement mechanism 
to sustain compliance within a range of global carbon taxes in the context of agreements 
to curb global GHG emissions.  
Enforcement mechanisms may consist of rewards to compliers such as technology 
transfer and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), or punishment to non-compliers 
such as trade sanctions in the form of punitive tariffs or border tax adjustments (BTAs). 
This study focuses on the punishment option and investigates empirically the viability of 
punitive tariffs in global GHG emissions mitigation agreements. While it is still an 
actively debated issue (Barrett, 2003; Perez, 2005; Stiglitz, 2006; Perez, 2007) there are 
some solid arguments in favor of the consistency of trade sanctions with regulations from 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). As noted by Stiglitz (2006) failing to curb 
emissions works in fact as a subsidy in non-signatory countries which gives signatory 
countries the right to prohibit or impose tariffs on the imports from non-signatory 
countries. Moreover, while retaliatory tariffs are not allowed under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by the WTO, Article XX of the GATT allows 
parties to take actions “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” or 
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”  
Trade sanctions have been used in the past as an enforcement mechanism in 
environmental agreements. For instance, trade sanctions have been successfully used as 
an enforcement mechanism to control Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS). Countries 
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signed the Montreal Protocol (UNEP, 1987) which employed trade restrictions and 
threats to ban trade in ODS and ODS-containing products with non-parties. Although the 
two problems, i.e. control of the ODSs and the GHG mitigation, have fundamental differ-
ences2 this study posits that trade sanctions in the form of punitive tariffs may constitute a 
viable enforcement mechanism to sustain compliance in a global GHG mitigation 
agreement.  
Punitive tariffs are a viable enforcement tool as long as they satisfy two 
conditions: credibility and effectiveness. A threat is credible if and only if the punisher is 
better off applying the punishment to the non-complying party. On the other hand, a 
threat is effective if and only if the punished country is better off complying rather than 
free riding and receiving the punishment. Fulfillment of the two conditions depends on 
the payoffs obtained in each scenario. Credibility imposes a condition on the payoff for 
the punisher while effectiveness constraints the payoff for the punished country. While a 
threat may be credible it may not be effective and vice versa.  
A few studies have shown theoretically that trade sanctions can work as an 
enforcement mechanism in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Barrett (1997) 
builds a simple static partial equilibrium model to show that trade sanctions, in particular 
banning trade of certain commodities between signatories and non-signatories, can 
constitute credible threats to convince free-riders to comply with an MEA. Barrett takes 
the Montreal Protocol (1987) as an example in which substances that deplete ozone layer 
                                                 
2
 Barrett (2007) lists the differences between the two problems. One difference is that in depletion of the 
ozone layer problem, everyone on Earth is affected in the same way, i.e., they all become worse off. In the 
global warming problem, on the other hand, different regions are affected by the problem in different ways, 
at least in the short term. For instance, while some regions become worse off because of sea level rise, 
some regions become better off because of the improved agricultural productivity in warmer climate. 
10 
 
are taken under control by banning trade of certain products between signatories and non-
signatories. Provision of the public good is then linked to international trade. Similarly, 
Finus (2001) notes that this link can contribute to an agreement in three respects: (1) 
leading to a more symmetric distribution of gains from cooperation; (2) increasing the 
number of options to be used as enforcement mechanisms; (3) converting a public good 
agreement into a club good agreement by using trade sanctions to exclude non signatories 
from the benefits of international trade. Naghavi (2010) builds a theoretical partial 
equilibrium model in which he demonstrates that trade sanctions can, credibly and 
effectively, enforce a MEA. These studies did not however analyze the empirical viability 
of trade sanctions. 
Among the empirical studies investigating the viability of punitive tariffs as an 
enforcement mechanism in MEAs (Dröge and Kemfert, 2005; Lessmann et al., 2009), the 
common tendency is to consider a specific scenario, such as Kyoto Protocol, and to check 
the credibility and or effectiveness of it. For example, Dröge and Kemfert (2005) 
investigate the effectiveness of 30% tariff on the U.S. products imported by the Annex I 
countries in convincing the U.S. to return to the Kyoto Protocol. For that purpose Dröge 
and Kemfert use the WIAGEM Model (Kemfert, 2002a; Kemfert, 2002b) which is an 
integrated assessment model. It is built by bringing a general equilibrium model of the 
global economics, a climate model and an ecological impact model together. Change in 
terms of trade is used as welfare measure. Their results show that 30% import tariff is not 
effective enough to convince the US to return to the Kyoto Protocol. 
Lessmann et al. (2009), on the other hand, conducts a numerical (though not 
empirically calibrated) assessment of the viability of import tariffs as an enforcement 
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mechanism in a MEA using an Integrated Assessment Model (IAM).  The authors 
identify tariff rates that would credibly and effectively enforce a MEA implementing a 
set of “optimal”, i.e. Nash equilibrium, abatement efforts. The optimal abatement efforts 
are determined based on actual benefits, i.e. prevented output losses, derived from them. 
However calculating “optimal” abatement levels in reality is a daunting task, not to 
mention that implementation of such optimal strategies may be politically infeasible. An 
empirically informative strategy to assess the viability of trade sanctions as enforcement 
mechanisms may be to investigate the range of abatement efforts that the sanctions could 
support and the sensitivity of that range to economic parameters. Yet there is a dearth of 
information on the link between emission taxes and the viability of trade sanctions to 
enforce them. Filling this gap would help to answer many empirically relevant questions. 
For example, is there a credible and effective tariff threat for all plausible values of 
emission taxes? Is this tariff, if one exists, unique? Are increases in emission tax 
associated with a larger or smaller range of credible and effective tariffs? In other words, 
can threats of trade sanctions effectively enforce more stringent climate policies? The 
latter question sheds light into potential tradeoffs between efficiency and stability. The 
study presented herein aims to answer these questions. 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge by investigating quantitatively 
the range of emission taxes that can be successfully enforced through punitive tariffs 
(used by the U.S. against China) in the context of global GHG mitigation agreements, 
and the robustness of this tool to changes in key structural parameters in the economy, i.e. 
preference parameters. Payoffs obtained by the punishing and the punished countries are 
determined by direct market effects of tariffs and by feedbacks from displacement of the 
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equilibrium in interrelated markets. Quantifying the latter requires a general equilibrium 
approach to the problem. This paper uses a global static computable general equilibrium 
GTAP-AEZ-GHG model (Golub et al., 2009; Hertel et al., 2009), to measure changes in 
payoffs associated with trade sanctions. Based on these payoffs the change in power of 
import tariff is computed at and below which the punishing region is better off applying 
the punishment. This is taken to be the threshold for the credibility condition. Then, this 
rate is compared with the threshold for the effectiveness condition; i.e. the minimum 
change in power of import tariff that can convince the punished region to comply with 
the global abatement agreement. In this model, the World economy is divided into three 
regions: the U.S., China, and the rest of the World (ROW). It is assumed that the U.S. 
will join the agreement as long as an enforcement mechanism is in place. Then, the 
viability of punitive tariffs as a mechanism through which the U.S. attempts to induce 
China to comply with a global emission tax policy is investigated. 
To analyze the link between emission taxes and the viability of trade sanctions as 
an enforcement mechanism a three-stage game is designed with the following structure. 
While an abatement policy is set by the U.S. and the rest of the world (ROW), China 
initially does not implement any GHG emission reductions. The U.S. threatens China 
with punitive tariffs on all Chinese products to induce China to set the same abatement 
policy. In this study, punitive tariffs are considered as a deterrent to free-riding. Therefore, 
if they are viable (i.e., credible and effective), there will be no need to use them. If 
punitive tariffs are viable then it is expected that a global environmental agreement will 
be signed and complied with by all three regions: the U.S., China, and ROW.  
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The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. The next section introduces 
research methodology. It contains a brief description of the GTAP-AEZ-GHG model, and 
a formal representation of the game. The results of my simulations are presented in 
Section 2.3. The sensitivity analysis is presented in Section 2.4 with a conclusion in the 
final section, Section 2.5. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 The GTAP-AEZ-GHG Model 
The model represents a modified version of the standard GTAP model (Hertel, 
1997). In the standard GTAP model there is a regional household that collects all factor 
income and taxes in the economy. Regional household behavior is governed by an 
aggregate utility function of the Cobb-Douglas form and it is specified over three sources 
of final demand: (i) composite private consumption, (ii) composite government 
consumption, and (iii) savings. Private household derives its utility from the consumption 
of domestic and imported goods and services based on a non-homothetic Constant 
Difference of Elasticity (CDE) functional form. Due to the non-homothetic nature of 
private household demand, elasticity of expenditure with respect to utility is not constant 
which is taken into account by the regional household optimization. The second final 
demand source is the government demand which is specified via Cobb-Douglas 
functional form. This assumption is reflected in the homothetic preferences and constant 
budget shares of government consumption of domestic and imported commodities. 
Savings is the third final demand in regional household’s utility. In the multi-region 
GTAP model there is a global sector called Global Bank which is assumed as a mediatory 
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between global savings and regional investment. One of the ways to think about the 
Global Bank is that it collects savings from all regions to finance regional investment. Or 
it can be thought of as purchasing capital goods and then sells them to regional 
households to meet their demand for savings. 
Producers in the GTAP model are assumed to maximize profits subject to 
constant returns to scale technologies in a perfectly competitive market. Production is 
modeled using a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) nested function. In the top 
level, the output is produced as a combination of value added and intermediate demand 
according to Leontief technology. In the second level, value added is split into primary 
factors such as land, skilled and unskilled labor, capital and natural resources according 
to CES technology. The GTAP model assumes separability in production. The firms are 
assumed to first choose their optimal mix of primary factors, and then determine the 
optimal mix of value-added and intermediate inputs. Producers use intermediate inputs 
which can be domestically produced or imported, again based on CES functional form. 
The sourcing of imported intermediate inputs is combined by a CES nest. The 
separability assumption applies here, as well. Firms are assumed to decide first on the 
sourcing of their inputs which determines the composite import price. Then, based on the 
resulting composite import price, firms choose the optimal mix of imported to domestic 
goods. 
The domestic region trades with the aggregated “rest of the world” for 
intermediate goods demanded by producers and for final consumption goods demanded 
by private household and government. In the GTAP model, the Armington approach to 
trade is employed so that domestic products and imported products coming from different 
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regions are imperfect substitutes. The GTAP model is a real model in the sense that all 
prices are relative to a numeraire.  
 The GTAP-AEZ-GHG model is developed in Golub et al. (2009) by applying the 
following modifications to the standard GTAP model.  
• Production and consumption structure of the model are modified to allow capital-
energy and inter-fuel substitution (Burniaux and Truong, 2002).  
• GHG emissions data including the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion (Lee, 2007) and non-carbon dioxide (non-CO2) emissions (methane, 
nitrous oxide and F-gases) documented in Rose and Lee (2009) are introduced into 
the model.  
• Within each of 24 sectors of the model, GHG emissions are tied to specific drivers 
such as primary factors, intermediate inputs, and output.  
• Land in each region is represented as a heterogeneous endowment divided up to 18 
agro-ecological zones (AEZs) (Lee et al. 2009). Each AEZ differs in terms of its 
suitability for production of crops, forestry and livestock.  
• The model incorporates mitigation cost curves for different sectors and regions based 
on data from the USEPA (USEPA, 2006) by calibrating relevant parameters in the 
GTAP-AEZ-GHG model to these curves.  
• The forestry component of the model is calibrated to the results of the state of the art 
partial equilibrium global forestry model documented in Sohngen and Mendelson 
(2007).  
• Forest extensification and intensification decisions are modeled separately better to 
isolate competition for land between agriculture and timber products.  
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The policy scenario considered in this study is a tax on emissions of greenhouse 
gases (CO2 and non-CO2) and a forest carbon sequestration incentive. An emissions tax is 
imposed on intermediate and primary input and output related emissions in agricultural 
and industrial sectors and emissions from private consumption of fossil fuels. Other 
studies on trade sanctions (Dröge and Kemfert, 2005; Lessmann et al., 2009; Naghavi, 
2010) set emissions tax only on output because their models tie all emissions directly to 
output. In this study, on the other hand, I employ a more refined approach and tie 
emissions to specific drivers within each sector.  
Separating emissions from primary and intermediate inputs from emissions from 
outputs allows for more flexibility in emissions reduction. In particular, in addition to 
output reduction, emission abatement can be achieved through reductions in the emission 
intensity of production. The extent to which emissions abatement is achieved through 
each channel in the economy, depends upon how freely production factors can move 
across sectors. As production factors become less mobile, the economy is increasingly 
dependent on production reductions to achieve abatement of emissions. In the model, 
there are four production factors: land, labor, capital and natural resources. It is assumed 
that labor and capital are perfectly mobile, land (differentiated into 18 zones) is partially 
mobile and natural resources are fixed. One limitation of our model is that it does not 
allow for quantification of the impacts of factor mobility assumptions on abatement 
mechanisms. Without adjustment costs on labor and capital, a sensitivity analysis of 




2.2.2 Structure of the Game 
I build a three-stage game to investigate the viability of punitive tariffs as an 
enforcement mechanism. In other words, the game structure is used to find conditions 
under which the U.S. threat against China is both credible and effective. The structure of 
the game is as follows. In Stage 1, the U.S. and ROW implement a mitigation policy and 
China plays a default strategy of no emissions reduction. In Stage 2, the U.S. observes 
China’s free-ride and threatens it by imposing punitive tariffs on all imports from China. 
In Stage 3, China observes the global emissions tax level and the punitive tariffs threat 
from the U.S. and decides whether or not to comply with the emissions tax (see Figure 
2.1). In this game, it is assumed that China does not retaliate against the U.S. tariffs 
because retaliation tariffs are not allowed under the GATT by the WTO. 
It is also assumed that there is no change in strategies of ROW while the U.S. is 
inducing China to comply with the agreement. The only role assigned to ROW is to 
participate in the abatement agreement. This is a reasonable assumption considering the 
fact that the EU, the biggest player in the ROW is already making efforts to curb its GHG 


















Figure 2.1 The Game Tree 
 
Welfare changes are used to measure the payoffs of the regions. The GTAP-AEZ-
GHG model is employed to quantify welfare changes associated with different 
combinations of strategies considered in the analysis. Concept of equivalent variation 
(EV) is applied to measure changes in the welfare of the regions3. Thus,  
, , 	, 
is the equivalent variation of region 
		{, , } when the emissions tax set by 
the U.S. and ROW is , the percentage change in the power of import tariffs4 imposed by 
the U.S. on Chinese imports if China free-rides is 		[0,1], and China’s action given the 
U.S.’s threat is 		 = 	 {
	
 , !"#$%}. 
                                                 
3
 In the model, the regional household’s EV is equal to the difference between the expenditure required to 
obtain new (post-simulation) level of utility at initial prices and initial expenditure. McDougall (2001) 
documents EV calculation in the GTAP model. 
 
4
 Power of a tax, by definition, is the ratio of the price with tax over the price without tax, i.e., equal to the 
tax rate plus one. Thus, if the power of tax is greater than one, the implemented rate is really a tax, and 

















2.3 Results   
The simulations5 show that in every scenario and for any level of emissions tax 
the equivalent variation of the U.S. is lower when China free rides than when it complies 
because of changes in terms of trade. That is, 
()*,  = 0, 

 	 < 	()*,  = 0, !"#$%	, ∀	 
Since free-riding by China always harms the U.S. for any level of emission tax, the U.S. 
has always incentives to threaten China to convince it to abate. Therefore in Stage 2, it is 
assumed that the U.S. threatens China with an increase in power of tariffs on imports 
from China. 
 
2.3.1 Credible Threats 
A tariff threat is viable as long as it is both credible and effective. Credibility 
depends on the welfare change of the punishing region. Effectiveness depends on the 
welfare change of the punished region. At a given emissions tax 	, a change in power of 
import tariffs imposed by the U.S. against Chinese products is incentive compatible for 
the U.S. when the cost of implementing the threat is lower than its benefits, rendering a 
higher equivalent variation to the U.S. That is 
()*,  = 0, 

 	 < 	()*,  > 0, 

 	. 
To assess the credibility of a tariff threat a very stringent abatement policy is 
initially considered and then it is investigated whether increasing the power of tariffs on 
Chinese imports (if China free rides) makes the U.S. better off. I do this by assuming that 
                                                 
5
 The results reported in this essay are obtained using the GEMPACK economic modeling software 
(Harrison and Pearson, 1996). 
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the global emissions tax is $35 per ton of carbon equivalent (TCE)6 and calculating EV 
for the U.S. at 1% increments in the power of import tariffs. Figure 2.2 shows how the 
U.S.’ EV changes with the power of tariffs imposed on Chinese imports. 
 
Figure 2.2 USA Equivalent Variation (USD million) under $35/TCE Emissions Tax 
The welfare change of the U.S. illustrated in Figure 2.2 follows an expected 
pattern: welfare loss first decreases and then increases as the power of tariff increases. 
Increasing the power of tariff on Chinese products entails costs and benefits for the U.S. 
On one hand, increasing the power of tariff improves terms of trade for the U.S., i.e., it 
increases the competitiveness of the U.S. production relative to that of China7. On the 
other hand, increasing the power of tariff increases the cost of consumption goods for U.S. 
                                                 
6
 To convert price per ton of CO2 to price per ton C, multiply by the ratio of molecular weights, 
44/12=3.67, i.e., $1/TCO2eq = $3.67/TCE.  
 
7
 Import tariffs decreases demand for imports and hence increases demand for domestic products which 
leads to decrease in exports. Lower exports increases export price of import tariff implementing country 
which increases the terms of trade of that country. By definition, the terms of trade is the ratio of export 















































consumers. Up to a critical point8 which is 5% in this case, the benefits of increasing the 
tariff outweigh the costs. Although the cost effective increase in the power of tariff for 
the U.S. is 5% at $35/TCE any increase in power of tariff above 10% reduces the U.S. 
welfare to a level even lower than in the scenario without the tariff (green line in Figure 
2.2)9. In such a case, it is more beneficial for the U.S. to let China free ride. Figure 2.2 
suggests that, with an emission tax of $35/TCE, the change in power of tariff is credible 
as long as it does not exceed 10%. 
()* = 35,  = 0, 

 	 < 	()* = 35,  ≤ 10, 

 	,	 
()* = 35,  = 0, 

 	 > 	()* = 35,  > 10, 

 	 
and     ()* = 35,  = 0, 

 	 = 	−756	5	"$$	(green line in Figure 2.2) 
For instance, at 11% change in power of tariffs, the total welfare loss in the U.S. exceeds 
the welfare loss under China non-compliance and no trade sanctions, rendering the threat 
non-credible. 
 
2.3.2 Effective Threats  
A tariff imposed by the U.S. against Chinese products is effective if China 
achieves a higher EV when complying with the global GHG mitigation agreement than 
free riding and receiving the punishment from the U.S. That is 
678,  = 0, !"#$%	 > 	678,  > 0, 

 	 
                                                 
8
 In the literature this critical point in the welfare change of the import tariff country is called optimal tariff. 
However, in this context it should be called cost effective tariff because of the analysis including only cost 
of abatement and ignoring benefits from it. 
 
9
 See Table A1 for the EV of the U.S. under different level of emissions taxes when China free rides but the 




678,  = 0, !"#$%	 = −7953 UDS million (green line in Figure 2.3)10 
The effectiveness of a tariff threat is verified by initially assuming that the global 
emissions tax is $35/TCE and varying the power of import tariff in 1% increments. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates China’s EV for a range of tariff threats imposed by the U.S. on the 
entire Chinese imports. As the U.S. increases the punishment level China’s EV decreases. 
However, up to 9% increase in power of tariffs, China’s welfare loss due to tariff 
punishment does not exceed the welfare loss associated with abatement. 
678 = 35,  = 9, 
	
 	 > 678 = 35,  = 0, !"#$%	 
−8,021	USD	million > 	−7,953	USD	million 
In other words, under the assumption that both ROW and the U.S. are taxing emissions in 
all sectors and provide forest carbon sequestration incentives at emission price $35/TCE, 
9% or more increase in power of import tariffs can convince China to comply with the 
mitigation policy. Therefore, 9% is the minimum change in power of tariff that is 
effective at the given emission tax. 
 
Figure 2.3 China’s Equivalent Variation (USD million) under $35/TCE Emissions Tax 
                                                 
10
 See Table A2 for the EV of China under different level of emissions taxes when China complies with the 











































2.3.3 Viable Threats  
When results illustrated in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 are brought together, I find that 
under an emission tax of $35/TCE, any change in power of import tariff between 9% and 
10% are both credible and effective. I then repeat this analysis for a range of emissions 
taxes. Figure 2.4 displays combinations of emissions taxes and changes in power of tariff 
for which a tariff threat is both credible and effective. The credibility curve (the blue line 
in Figure 2.4) represents the maximum change in power of tariff that the U.S. is willing 
to implement to convince China at a given emission tax. The combinations of tax and 
tariffs below that line achieve credibility; i.e. the U.S. is better off implementing the 
punitive tariff than not implementing it when China is free riding. The effectiveness 
curve (the red curve in Figure 2.4) represents the minimum change in power of tariff that 
can convince China to comply at a given emission tax. Combinations above the red line 
achieve effectiveness; i.e., China is better off complying and avoiding the punitive tariff 
than free riding and being punished. The effectiveness curve is convex and monotonically 
increasing. This is an expected result considering the fact that as the environmental policy 
becomes more stringent it becomes more costly for China to abate and hence the 
minimum change in power of tariff that can induce China to abate  increases.  
The area below the blue line and above the red line constitutes the set of emission 
tax and change in power of tariff combinations that achieve both credibility and 
effectiveness simultaneously. The blue line intersects the red line at the point where 
emission tax is $38/TCE meaning that changes in power of the tariff can credibly and 
effectively support emission taxes less than or equal to $38/TCE. The set of credible and 
effective threats shrinks as the emission tax increases from 0 to $38/TCE, and becomes 
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null afterwards. Therefore the results suggest a trade-off between abatement level 
targeted and self-enforcement of an international environmental agreement. As the 
emission price increases, an increasingly smaller set of power of tariffs achieve both 
credibility and effectiveness. On a positive note, these results suggest that though the 
ability of punitive tariffs to successfully enforce a MEA is limited, it is still substantial; 
an emission tax of $38/TCE is far from being trivial. 
 
Figure 2.4 Credible and Effective Changes in Power of Import Tariffs across Emissions 
Taxes 
 
Under global abatement with a $38/TCE emissions tax (the most stringent policy 
for which trade sanctions are still a viable enforcement mechanism), the U.S.’s and 
China’s welfare changes are -291 USD million and -8,794 USD million,11 respectively 
(see Table 2.1). If China rejects abatement and chooses to free ride and the U.S. does not 
impose a sanction, China’s welfare increases by 761 USD million but the U.S.’s welfare 
is reduced by 1,234 USD million. To convince China to implement abatement, the U.S. 
                                                 
11
 Welfare changes are negative because benefits from pollution abatement are not considered. As 




































would have to impose a 10% increase in the power of tariff on all China’s tradable goods. 
Under the trade sanction, the U.S. welfare change becomes -1,224 USD million which is 
slightly smaller welfare loss than in the case when Chine free-rides with no punishment. 
However, China’s welfare change becomes -8,809 USD million which is slightly bigger 
welfare loss than in the case when China abates. Therefore, while a 10% increase in 
import tariff makes a free-riding China worse off than complying with abatement 
(making it an effective threat), its cost to U.S. is not as high as letting China free-ride 
(making it a credible threat). 
 
Table 2.1 Welfare Changes of the U.S. and China for Different Scenarios under $38/TCE 




China free-rides  
but USA does not punish 
China free-rides and USA 
increases power of tariff by 10% 
USA -291 -1,234 -1,224 
CHN -8,794 761 -8,809 
 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the EV of the U.S. under varying emissions tax and change 
in power of tariffs. This figure reveals that the U.S.’s welfare increases with initial 
increases in power of tariffs for a given emission tax. After a certain point, however, 
additional increase in the power of tariff starts to reduce the U.S.’s EV. Moreover, 





Figure 2.5 USA Equivalent Variation across Emissions Taxes and Changes in Power of 
Tariff (USD million) 
 
 
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
The GTAP-AEZ-GHG model employs Armington specification of international 
trade (Armington, 1969) which assumes that commodities produced in different regions 
are imperfect substitutes. Figure 2.5 is consistent with the market power effect of tariffs 
noted by Lessmann et al. (2009). Under the assumption that commodities are 
differentiated according to their origins, each region obtains some market power12. 
Implementation of tariffs by coalition members increases their market power and hence 
their terms of trade. This positive terms-of-trade effect increases the welfare of the region 
that imposes the tariff which gives incentives not only to the coalition member regions to 
use tariffs against free-riders but also to the free-riders to comply with the MEA. When 
the U.S. increases its tariff on Chinese imports the terms-of-trade of the U.S. are 
                                                 
12
 Under the Armington assumption, while there is no domestic production of imported varieties there is 
demand for all varieties. Thus, each region has some market power for their own variety.  
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improved which leads to an increase in welfare in the U.S. However, just like in 
monopoly pricing, as the change in power of import tariff exceeds a threshold value the 
benefits of a tariff to the U.S. start to vanish13.  
The econometric estimates of the Armington elasticities provided in Hertel et al. 
(2007) are used in this modeling work. In this section, I explore how the thresholds of 
change in power of import tariffs and emissions tax depend on the Armington elasticities 
when the values of the parameter are systematically increased and decreased by two 
standard deviations to higher and lower values. We find that the qualitative pattern of the 
thresholds of punitive tariffs and emission taxes are reasonably robust to alternative 
values of the Armington elasticities (see Table 2.2)14. 
 
Table 2.2 Thresholds of Power of Import Tariff and Emissions Tax under Varying 
Armington Elasticities 
Trade elasticities Change in power of tariff (%) Emissions tax ($/TCE) 
Original 10 38 
High 9.3 34 
Low 10.7 40 
 
Figure 2.6 presents how the set of credible and effective trade threats changes 
when the Armington elasticities are changed by two standard deviations estimated by 
Hertel et al. (2007). Under high Armington elasticities, the credibility and effectiveness 
thresholds intersect at a 9.3% change in power of the tariff and a tax of $34/TCE (see 
Table 2.2). As revealed by Figure 2.6, the increase in Armington elasticities shrinks the 
                                                 
13
 See Zhang (2006) for details about the relationship between the Armington assumption and terms-of-
trade effects of a tariff. 
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size of the set of credible and effective threats. As the Armington elasticities increase, 
commodities with different origins become more substitutable and hence the market 
power effect of tariffs vanishes. In such case, a change in power of tariff by 9.3% 
imposed by the U.S. on Chinese imports is the limit for a punitive tariff to stay both 
credible and effective.  
Conversely, when the Armington elasticities are low, tariff threats to China are 
both credible and effective as long as the change in power of tariff does not increase by 
more than 10.7% and the emissions tax is not higher than $40/TCE (see Table 2.2). As 
the commodities from different origins become less substitutable, captured by a reduction 
in Armington elasticities, impact of tariffs on terms of trade increases and hence the set of 
both credible and effective tariff threats expands from 10% to 10.7% change in power of 
import tariff and from $38/TCE to $40/TCE in emissions tax. 
 












































As the two largest GHG emitters, the U.S. and China are two major players in the 
game of GHG mitigation. Because the game has the structure of a prisoner’s dilemma, 
due to absence of a viable enforcement mechanism both countries have, so far, refused to 
cooperate. In this study, under the assumption that the U.S. abates its emissions along 
with the rest of the world but China, it is investigated under what conditions trade 
sanctions in the form of punitive tariffs become a viable tool to deter China from free-
riding, and have China agree to take the same abatement measures with the rest of the 
world.   
For threat of trade sanctions to become a viable enforcement mechanism punitive 
tariffs have to achieve two conditions defined in this study: credibility and effectiveness. 
Unlike other studies, we do not presume to calculate an optimal emission tax but rather 
we employ a computable general equilibrium model to estimate empirically the range of 
emission taxes that can be successfully enforced through trade sanctions. 
In particular we found that the U.S. has always, i.e., under all emission tax levels, 
incentives to use trade sanctions as enforcement mechanism to convince China to comply 
with the global mitigation agreement. It is also found that in a scenario where China is 
refusing to implement an emissions tax there is a set of emission taxes and changes in 
import tariffs for which trade sanctions constitute a viable enforcement mechanism for 
the environmental agreement. The viability of trade sanctions as an enforcement 
mechanism vanishes at high levels of emission taxes which suggests a potential trade-off 
between abatement levels targeted and self-enforcement of an international 
environmental agreement.  
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Our sensitivity analyses with respect to Armington elasticities show that the set of 
emission taxes that can be successfully supported through trade sanctions is reasonably 
robust to alternative values of the Armington elasticities. Therefore, in general, this study 
supports the hypothesis that trade sanctions in the form of punitive tariff could be used as 
an enforcement mechanism to achieve a global GHG mitigation agreement.  
Current CO2 price in the EU market is around €7 which makes carbon (C) price 
around $35/TCE under an exchange rate of 1.32 $/€. This means the de-facto current 
emissions tax in Europe is already very close to $38/TCE, i.e., the maximum enforceable 
emissions tax (MET) under punitive tariff mechanism. However, it should be noted that 
since benefits of abatement are not included in the analysis, this study measures the 
bounds of credibility and effectiveness conditions. This essay provides a lower bound for 
the effectiveness condition, an upper bound of the credibility conditions, and thus a lower 
bound of the maximum enforcement emissions tax.  
It should be noted that the results are not likely to be robust with respect to 
changes in the role of each region in the abatement game. The set of emissions taxes and 
changes in power of tariff for which a tariff threat is both credible and effective is 
expected to be different when the U.S. threatens China than when China threatens the 
U.S. We expect the number of such combinations to be fewer when China imposes 
punitive tariffs on imports from the U.S. for China to induce the U.S. for abatement. 
Since, the value of exports from China to the U.S. is greater than the value of exports 
from the U.S. to China, the threat power of the U.S. against China through international 
trade is greater than that of China against the U.S. Therefore, we expect China to have 
31 
 





CHAPTER 3. EFFECTS OF EMISSION-BASED BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS ON 
EMISSIONS LEAKAGE AND COMPETITIVENESS IN AGRICULTURAL 
SECTORS 
3.1 Introduction 
Given the likely absence of a “top-down” global agreement after the 2012 expiry 
of the Kyoto Protocol, many countries (or groups of countries) may only be prepared to 
introduce a price on carbon emissions if they can maintain the competitiveness of their 
domestic sectors and prevent leakage effects associated with the expansion of 
unregulated sectors in other countries. One means of achieving these is through emission-
based border tax adjustments (BTAs) which are tariffs on emissions embodied in imports 
coming from countries which are not controlling their emissions. 
While BTAs may be an attractive option for countries wishing to pursue unilateral 
mitigation policies, there are some significant challenges that would need to be overcome 
before BTAs could be implemented. One major difficulty is how to measure the 
emissions that are embodied in imports. In this chapter I investigate the economic and 
environmental performance of emissions-based Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs) and 
examine sensitivity of these economic and environmental results to alternative methods 





Recent studies have investigated the effects of BTAs on emissions leakage, 
welfare and competitiveness under different climate change policy scenarios 
(Burniaux et al., 2010; Winchester, 2011; Hubler, 2011; Monjon and Quirion, 2011; 
Weitzel and Peterson, 2011; Seymore et al., 2011; and Zhou et al., 2011; Bohringer et 
al., 2012; Foure et al., 2013). Branger and Quirion (2013) provide a detailed literature 
review on papers about impacts of BTAs on emission leakage and competitiveness. 
Most of these studies have focused on CO2 combustion emissions from manufacturing 
sectors. The overall conclusion from the literature is that effectiveness of BTAs is 
quite heterogeneous. The size of the BTA-implementing countries, the number of 
countries in a coalition, suppliers’ response to a BTA, and the method of 
implementation are listed as some of the determinants of the effectiveness of BTAs. 
The observed heterogeneity suggests that additional studies are required to assess the 
effectiveness of BTAs in the context of other sectors and other types of GHG 
emissions.  
Bohringer et al. (2012) compare twelve computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models used in the literature to assess impacts of BTAs on emissions leakage and 
competitiveness. The authors harmonize the assumptions of the twelve models and 
use a common database, i.e., GTAP Version 7.1 database. The climate policy 
Bohringer et al. stucy is a collective 20% emission reduction from its historic 
emisison level in 2004 (and this collective target is equally distributed across all 
members of Annex I). In that study, emission-based BTAs are implemeted by Annex 
I (including te U.S. but exluding Russia) only on the emisison intensive and trade-
exposed (EITE) sectors. The emission content of a product is measured by 
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considering direct emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels and indirect 
emissions associated with the generation of electricity. Bohringer et al. find that when 
emission-based BTAs are not implemented leakage rates range between 5% and 19% 
with a mean value across all models of 12% in EITE sectors. When BTAs are 
implemented by Annex I to the EITE goods from non-coalition regions, emission 
leakge rates range between 2% and 12% with a mean value of 8%.  
The role of BTAs in the context of agriculture has received less attention 
compared with that in manufacturing sectors. While agriculture plays a small role in 
CO2 combustion emissions, it is much more important in the context of the hitherto 
under-emphasized, non-CO2 emissions, including methane and nitrous oxide. There is 
growing awareness in the literature about how much contribution to global GHG 
mitigation can be made by livestock and crop sectors (Steinfeld et al., 2006; Steinfeld 
and Wassenaar, 2007; Smith et al., 2008; Rose et al., 2012; Bellarby et al., 2008; 
CAST, 2004; McKinsey and Company, 2009). By drawing on recent research on non-
CO2 emissions and abatement possibilities in global agricultural sectors, this chapter 
seeks to complement and extend the existing literature on emission-based BTAs. 
Furthermore, to my knowledge, there is no study in the literature which provides 
sensitivity analysis of these economic and environmental impacts of BTAs in 
agricultural sectors to alternative approaches to measure embodied emissions in 
imports15. This chapter aims to fill in this gap in the literature as well. 
This essay builds on an extended version of the GTAP-AEZ-GHG model 
which is documented in Golub et al. (2009). The focus of the BTA analysis presented 
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here is both crop sectors and livestock sectors (see Appendix Tables C1 and C2 for 
region and sector aggregation). Following Burniaux et al. (2010), the effects of BTAs 
on emission leakage, welfare, and competitiveness are assessed in two regional 
configurations: first, with the EU operating alone and second, considering the Annex 
I region as a whole. Four scenarios are considered: in the first two scenarios (EU and 
Annex1), the EU alone and Annex I as a whole, respectively, impose 27$/tCO2eq 
GHG emissions tax on all sectors and provide 27$/tCO2eq carbon sequestration 
incentive to forest producers. In the other two scenarios (EU_BTA and Annex1_BTA), 
in addition to the GHG emission tax and forest carbon sequestration incentive, 
emission-based BTAs are introduced by EU and Annex I, respectively, on all imports 
from non-abating regions. None of these policy scenarios includes export rebates. 
Because of the vague legal status of export rebates, the policy scenarios in this study 
consider import tariffs only. Böhringer et al. (2012) show that inclusion of export 
rebates to policy scenarios does not have significant impact on the results of 
performance of BTAs on reduction of emissions leakage and recovery of 
competitiveness loss.  
Similar to earlier studies (Avetisyan et al. 2011, Golub et al. 2012), it is found 
that unilateral imposition of an emissions tax changes the pattern of agricultural 
sectors competitiveness at the global scale dramatically. Furthermore, the BTAs are 
not very effective to relieve the burden of emission taxation on the implementing 
regions’ net exports of agricultural products, in both Annex1 and EU27 scenarios. In 
Annex1 scenario, emissions leakage through the agricultural sectors is 32%. BTAs 
reduce this rate to 13%, which means that the BTA level considered in this essay is 
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not strong enough to fully eliminate the emissions leakage in non-Annex I 
agricultural sectors. In EU scenario, on the other hand, 39% emissions leakage in the 
agricultural sectors declines to 0.42%. This shows that, similar to what Burniaux et al. 
(2010) concluded, the effectiveness of BTAs is reduced with increase in coalition size. 
Whereas BTAs are capable of fully eliminating emission leakage when only EU 
abates their emissions, this is not the case for the Annex1_BTA scenario. 
In this essay, two alternative methods are considered to calculate the 
emissions embodied in a product, namely Direct_only approach (D_O), and Direct 
and Indirect (D&I) approach. The D_O approach includes only direct emissions from 
production processes. More comprehensive method, the D&I approach include total 
direct and indirect emissions. Using livestock sectors as an example, total emissions 
from primary livestock production are calculated by taking into account direct 
emissions from livestock farming and manure management, as well as indirect 
emissions from producing feed for animals, growing crops to produce the feed and so 
on. In addition to these emissions, processed livestock products also embody 
additional emissions from processing and transportation.  
The next step in BTA implementation is calculation of emissions embodied in 
imported goods. An appropriate portion of the total sector emissions obtained is 
assigned to exports of product i from region s to r, based on the share of the bilateral 
exports in total region s output of the product in question. The final step is to 
calculate the tax on these emissions and apply them to the imports16.  
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The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model 
used in this study. Section 3.3 describes the alternative methods to calculate 
emissions associated with production of a good. Section 3.4 presents the scenarios 
and results focusing on the effects of BTAs. Section 3.5 discusses sensitivity analysis 
of main results. Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 The revised GTAP-AEZ-GHG Model 
The GTAP-AEZ-GHG model (Golub et al., 2009) is an integrated framework 
that links the agricultural, forestry, food processing and other sectors through land, 
and other factor markets and international trade, and incorporates different land-types, 
land uses and related GHG emissions and sequestration. (See Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation for more description.)  
 Important extensions of the model for this paper include: (1) updating the 
global economic data for the model from 2001 to 2004 (from Version 6 Dimaranan, 
2006) to Version 7 (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008) of the GTAP Data Base); (2) 
increasing the number of global regions from 3 to 19 (see Table A1); (3) 
disaggregation of regional ruminant livestock sectors into ruminant meat and dairy; (4) 
calibration of the agricultural sectors of the model to disaggregated marginal 
abatement cost curves (MACs) that correspond to the new model region and sector 
structure; (5) updating forest carbon sequestration supply curves using a new forestry 
model that conforms to the regions, AEZ structure and land supply structure of the 
CGE model; (6) the model covers carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion in addition to the methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), fluorinated gases 
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(F-gases) emissions and forest carbon stock data that were used in three region model. 
Modifications 2-6 were incorporated in earlier study (Golub et al. 2012) to analyze 
impacts of GHG mitigation policies on livestock sector using version 6 of GTAP data 
base. Finally, embodied emissions are included to the base dataset and then new 
structure supporting BTAs is introduced to the model (7). In the model, BTA tax 
revenue is given back to the household in the abating region.  
Unlike other studies on BTA analysis (Burniaux et al. (2010), Winchester 
(2011), Hubler (2011), Monjon and Quirion (2011), Weitzel and Peterson (2011), 
Seymore et al. (2011), Zhou et al. (2011), Bohringer et al. (2012)) I do not aim to 
achieve a specific regional emissions reduction since I am focusing on the outcome in 
just a few sectors. Instead, following Golub et al. (2012), I exogenously set the carbon 
price at 27$/tCO2eq and investigate the effects of the illustrative abatement policy on 
leakage and competitiveness in agricultural sectors. Emissions in agriculture are 
distinguished not only by sector of origin, but also by driver (e.g., nitrous oxide 
emissions from coarse grains production are tied to fertilizer applications; methane 
emissions from paddy rice production are tied to land). Other features that 
differentiate this study from other BTA analyses include the incorporation of the 
forest carbon sequestration and explicit competition for land between agriculture and 





3.3 Two Methods to Calculate Emissions Embodied in Products 
3.3.1 Direct_Only Approach (D_O) 
D_O is a simple method and includes only direct emissions from production 
processes. Using livestock farming sectors as an example, total emissions from 
livestock production are calculated by taking into account only direct emissions from 
livestock farming and manure management. However, indirect emissions are ignored 
such as emissions from producing feed for animals, emissions from growing crops to 
produce the feed, emissions from processing and transportation. This method is easy 
to implement, and, of the three methods considered, it requires the most parsimonious 
computational time and data requirements. On the other hand, the method ignores 
indirect emissions and as a result underestimates emissions embodied in a product 
which may cause to misleading results. In this essay, it is aimed to investigate how 
important to include indirect emissions into embodied emissions calculations. 
 
3.3.2 Direct&Indirect Approach (D&I) 
The D&I method considers both direct and indirect emissions. The total of 
these emissions are estimated by running the model as a quantity-based, global input-
output model in which all prices are fixed at their baseline level and output is simply 
doubled. With fixed prices, no substitution will occur, and to double the production of 
that sector input use in the sector should double as well. This will trigger increases in 
the production of those inputs and associated emissions. Of course these rises in 
inputs and emissions will not be full 100% unless the expanding sector is the only 
user of these inputs. Furthermore, the input supply sectors must also expand their 
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purchases, thereby leading to further rounds of emissions, and so on. By solving the 
entire model at once the approach captures all of these direct and indirect changes in 
emissions (Golub et al., 2010).  
In D&I approach, the process described above is conducted for each 29 
sectors and 19 regions of the model separately17 which makes 29x19 simulations to 
run
18
. This feature of the model makes it the more computationally demanding but 
also the more accurate approach than the D_O method. In terms of modeling and 
computing time the D_O approach is simpler than the D&I approach. Therefore, in 
this essay, the D&I approach is considered as the main approach of this essay and the 
results from this method are compared with the results of the D_O approach. It should 
be noted, however, that in BTAs analysis presented below employing the D&I 
approach to emissions embodied in a good some emissions will be tax twice. 
 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report regional total, direct and indirect, emissions from 
livestock and crop sectors, respectively. The ruminant meat sector (before processing) 
is responsible for 2,649 MtCO2eq. Adding 958 from primary non-ruminants and 718 
from dairy production results in total 4,325
 
MtCO2eq emissions from the global 
livestock production.  
Table 3.2 reports that total emissions from crop sectors amount to 3,303 
MtCO2eq. Other agricultural activities (OthAgri) and paddy rice production are the 
                                                 
17
 To save computing time, it might be suggested that the procedure might have been conducted for 
each sector separately but for all regions together. Why such suggestion would be inaccurate is 
discussed in Appendix B.  
 
18
 GEMPACK 11.2 (2013), the latest release of the program can run simulations simultaneously 
through “Parameter Substitution”. This new feature of the program allows one to automate simulation 
runs. See Horridge and Jerie (2013) for more details about how to run large number of simulations and 




two leading emitters among crop sectors responsible for 1,188 MtCO2eq and 819 
MtCO2eq, respectively. Paddy rice in China and Rest of Southeast Asia (R_SE_Asia) 
are the two leading contributors among all crop sectors and regions emitting 287 and 
159 MtCO2eq, respectively. 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 also contain the share of direct emissions in the total 
emissions in primary livestock and crop sectors output, respectively. Large direct 
emission shares in crop sectors may suggest that for those sectors D_O approach may 
be sufficient to calculate the emission content of the products accurately. This 
hypothesis is analyzed in the next section. In the livestock sectors, on the other hand, 
much smaller shares of direct emissions in the total embodied emissions have already 
signals that D_O approach is not an appropriate method to calculate the carbon 











Table 3.1 Direct and Indirect Emissions Embodied in Primary and Processing Livestock Sectors (MtCO2eq) and Percentage Share of 
Direct Emissions in Total (%) 
 
  Dairy_Farms Ruminant NonRuminant Proc_Dairy Proc_Rum Proc_NonRum 
  value % value % value % value % value % value % 
USA 88.87 61 179 79 89.08 63 107 7 209.3 4 101 4 
EU27 138.8 81 185 87 121 66 173 7 117.3 3 155 3 
BRAZIL 38.27 91 324 98 31.55 77 29 1 277.3 0 50 0 
CAN 10.13 55 32 89 10.39 41 12 2 31.08 0 6 1 
JAPAN 8.42 68 9 70 13.46 62 12 10 17.6 1 7 3 
CHIHKG 18.07 69 322 94 388.6 45 46 0 43.12 1 104 1 
INDIA 39.04 82 222 95 26.57 67 26 11 2.366 14 0 0 
C_C_Amer 26.58 62 82 93 20.15 44 66 1 39.05 9 7 2 
S_o_Amer 38.71 76 232 98 30.86 61 34 1 127.6 1 29 1 
E_Asia 4.809 56 16 87 22.66 53 7 5 13.17 1 19 1 
Mala_Indo 0.945 85 41 93 16.87 68 9 3 15.83 0 3 3 
R_SE_Asia 3.359 86 79 98 36.33 65 6 2 34.5 1 26 4 
R_S_Asia 41.18 57 140 88 27.6 63 26 6 20.29 4 65 2 
Russia 63.67 66 43 77 14.16 59 19 9 63.91 1 6 5 
Oth_CEE_CIS 84.89 79 71 83 25.1 47 53 5 24.12 5 8 4 
Oth_Europe 6.027 84 5 82 1.97 46 6 4 2.276 3 2 2 
MEAS_NAfr 23.53 68 59 91 24.36 72 24 3 34.07 1 10 0 
S_S_AFR 55.22 98 496 99 50.89 86 20 1 135.7 0 48 0 
Oceania 27.64 86 112 95 6.055 64 32 3 58.22 1 18 1 







Table 3.2 Direct and Indirect Emissions Embodied in Crops (MtCO2eq) and Percentage Share of Direct Emissions in Total (%) 
 
  Paddy_Rice Wheat CrGrains Oilseeds Sugar_Crop OthAgri 
  value % value % value % value % value % value % 
USA 12.32 94 23.02 86 96.58 86 40.43 85 3.52 85 132.35 83 
EU27 3.25 97 27.28 79 34.42 83 21.17 70 11.04 81 169.91 78 
BRAZIL 14.65 63 2.54 64 13.07 75 52.73 77 11.64 67 43.30 75 
CAN 0.01 0 9.94 72 5.40 75 9.08 80 0.20 91 17.12 81 
JAPAN 14.95 69 1.06 68 0.15 65 0.21 65 0.44 50 25.67 65 
CHIHKG 287.32 94 56.46 70 37.45 70 28.72 69 5.02 72 472.10 71 
INDIA 122.66 78 90.33 11 18.82 8 54.95 12 14.53 13 138.97 12 
C_C_Amer 3.40 86 0.59 46 8.68 48 1.82 64 3.00 59 33.84 50 
S_o_Amer 18.50 96 10.60 79 17.22 81 35.85 85 2.99 73 58.33 78 
E_Asia 18.69 81 0.81 92 1.23 79 0.58 71 0.37 79 26.47 69 
Mala_Indo 60.47 97 0.02 0 1.93 33 4.17 57 0.79 64 15.27 35 
R_SE_Asia 159.37 98 0.12 66 1.36 71 0.89 71 1.87 74 19.71 74 
R_S_Asia 76.53 80 13.69 52 4.50 68 3.49 56 4.49 47 54.82 45 
Russia 1.71 94 6.34 60 11.61 64 1.31 59 0.38 66 32.78 64 
Oth_CEE_CIS 2.39 95 18.12 60 17.13 63 4.59 65 4.62 67 102.44 62 
Oth_Europe 0.00 0 0.44 80 0.92 80 0.31 45 0.18 82 4.00 70 
MEAS_NAfr 11.23 92 14.66 41 13.64 52 2.58 52 1.63 47 41.96 51 
S_S_AFR 51.35 97 3.17 69 32.03 79 3.15 74 11.00 72 89.94 79 
Oceania 0.85 97 3.22 68 1.31 66 0.58 62 1.08 65 18.60 61 





3.4 Scenarios and Impacts of BTAs 
3.4.1 Results with D&I Approach 
The impacts of the 27$/tCO2eq Annex I emission tax and forest carbon 
sequestration subsidy on livestock and crop sectors without and with BTAs can be seen in 
Table 3.3 and Figures 3.2 – 3.11. Table 3.3 presents the global welfare changes under 
four scenarios: Annex I without BTA, Annex I with BTA, EU without BTA, and EU with 
BTA. Welfare impacts of abatement policy and BTAs are measured by Hicksian 
equivalent variation in income. Table 3.3 shows that BTAs are effective in shifting 
burden of abatement from acting regions to non-acting regions. Welfare loss of Annex I 
decreases from 0.2% to 0.1% by implementing BTAs on imports from non-Annex I 
regions. On the other hand, welfare loss of non-Annex I increases from 0.16% to 0.7% 
with BTAs.  
Table 3.3 shows that the increase in the welfare loss with the coalition size is not 
as much as Burniaux et al.’s (2010) findings. In Burniaux et al. (2010), global welfare 
loss due to the abatement policy increases six-fold from 0.1% to 0.6% as the coalition 
expands from EU to Annex I. In this essay, however the global welfare loss increases 
only two-fold from 0.1% to only 0.2% with the coalition size. This is an expected result 
considering the major difference between the two studies that the emissions price is fixed 
at 27$/tCO2eq in our study while it is endogenous and varying between 20$/tCO2eq and 
43$/tCO2eq in Burniaux et al. (2010) study (see Table 3.3). Clearly, the larger tax, the 





Table 3.3 Welfare Impacts of BTAs under Different Scenarios for D&I Approach 
    Emissions tax 
(USD/tCO2eq) 
EV (%) 




noBTA 27 -0.2 -0.2 -0.16 
Annex1 
BTA 27 -0.2 -0.1 -0.7 
EU noBTA 27 -0.1 -0.2 0.01 





noBTA 43.3 -0.6 -0.8 -0.3 
Annex1 
BTA 43.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 
EU noBTA 20.9 -0.1 -0.3 0 
EU BTA 22.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 
 
Figures 3.2 - 3.5 show the percentage changes in GHG emissions from livestock 
and crop sectors in the two scenarios in Annex I and non-Annex I, respectively. Overall, 
non-Annex I livestock and cropping emissions expand in the absence of BTAs. Similar to 
findings reported in Ghosh et al. (2012), with BTAs, the picture is reversed dramatically 
in Brazil for livestock and crop sectors. This is an expected result considering the fact 
that considerable portion of GHG emissions in Brazil are non-CO2 emissions from 
agriculture.  
Impacts of BTAs on production are illustrated in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 for livestock 
sectors, Figures 3.8 and 3.9 for crop sectors. BTAs of Annex I affects the production of 
Brazil, Sub-Saharan Africa (S_S_Afr), Central and Caribbean America (C_C_Amer), and 
the rest of South East Asia (R_SE_Asia). The changes in trade balances by livestock 
sector and region in both scenarios, presented in Figure 3.10, show that the emissions tax 
in Annex I dramatically changes the pattern of global competitiveness (similar finding is 
reported in Avetisyan et al., 2011). BTAs are also helpful to reduce negative impact of 
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emission tax on livestock sectors net exports. Similar result is observed in crop sectors, as 
well (see Figure 3.11).  
In addition to the analysis of the impacts of BTAs implemented by Annex I 
regions against non-Annex I regions, the analysis of the EU only case is also investigated 
in this essay (see Appendix C for the figures of this case). The analysis is important 
because the EU is seriously considering the use of BTAs. Results show that as with the 
Annex1 scenario, livestock and crop production and emissions in untaxed regions 
dramatically expand in the absence of BTAs. Unlike Annex1 case, BTAs implemented by 
EU on non-EU products are helpful in supporting agricultural output in EU: reductions in 
livestock and crop sectors outputs are smaller with BTAs; and there is even an increase in 
the EU paddy rice production. The changes in trade balances by livestock sector and 
region for both simulations shows that BTAs implemented by the EU27 are helpful to 









Figure 3.1 Changes in Emissions from Livestock Sectors in Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax 





























































































































Figure 3.2 Changes in Emissions from Livestock Sectors in non-Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions 













































































































































































































Figure 3.3 Changes in Emissions from Crop Sectors in Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax in 





























































































































Figure 3.4 Changes in Emissions from Crop Sectors in non-Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax 













































































































































































































Figure 3.5 Changes in Outputs from Livestock Sectors in Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax in 



























































































































Figure 3.6 Changes in Outputs from Livestock Sectors in non-Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions 








































































































































































































Figure 3.7 Changes in Outputs from Crop Sectors in Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax in all 































































































































Figure 3.8 Changes in Outputs from Crop Sectors in non-Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax in 





































































































































































































Figure 3.9 Changes in Livestock Sector Trade Balances when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax on All Sectors and 
























































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.10 Changes in Crop Sector Trade Balances when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax on All Sectors and 




3.4.2 Impacts of BTAs under D&I versus D_O Approaches 
3.4.2.1 Welfare Change 
In this section, impacts of BTAs on key variables are compared when the total of 
emissions in products contains either only direct emissions (D_O approach) or both direct 
and indirect emissions (D&I approach).  Figure 3.13 shows the comparison. As expected, 
ignoring indirect emissions in total emission calculations causes the impact of BTAs on 
global welfare changes to be underestimated. D_O approach estimates the global welfare 
losses because of climate policy with BTA application in Annex I to be 77,554 million 
USD. However, D&I approach estimates 82,420 million USD. Clearly, underestimation 
of embodied emissions in D_O approach leads BTAs to impose less distortion to the 
economy and hence the overall welfare loss would be underestimated. Underestimation 
of carbon content of products also causes recovery impacts of BTAs on welfare of BTA 
implementer regions to be underestimated. According to results shown in Figure 3.13, 
largest underestimation of positive impacts of BTAs on implementer-county’s economy 
occurs in the US and the EU in Annex1_BTA scenario. Parallel to this analysis, omitting 
the indirect emissions in the carbon content of imports leads polluting countries, such as 
China, to be less effected from BTA application. It is a trivial result that the level of 





Figure 3.11 Welfare Impacts of BTAs under D&I versus D_O Approaches 
 
3.4.2.2 Emission Leakage Rate 
The emissions leakage rate is defined as the ratio of additional GHG emissions in 
non-abating regions (non-Annex I countries in Annex1 scenario) to the emission 
reduction achieved by the abating countries (Annex I countries in Annex1 scenario). 
Table 3.4 presents the emissions leakage at $27/tCO2eq emission tax with and without 
BTA cases for three total emission calculation methods. Results show that under D&I 
approach, without BTAs, emissions leakage in livestock and crop sectors because of 
climate policy of Annex I are 45% and 16%, respectively. When the EU is the only GHG 
abating region, emissions leakage in livestock and crop sectors become 52% and 16%, 
respectively. When the EU implement BTAs, the emission leakage rate in crop sectors 
drops down to -13%, which means that emissions in non-EU crop sectors are also 
reduced under BTAs. With BTAs, imports from non-EU become more expensive and EU 
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emissions19. Although BTAs do not have the reverse leakage effect on livestock sectors, 
they are still powerful enough to make remarkable impacts on the leakage rate in those 
sectors. Namely, emission leakage in non-EU livestock sectors decreases from 52% to 
8%. Finally, BTAs applied by the EU reduce economy–wide emissions leakage from 19% 
to 2%.  
In D&I method, BTAs implemented by Annex I reduce emissions leakage rate in 
livestock and crop sectors 20% and 5%, respectively. Under Annex I BTAs, D_O 
approach calculates the leakage rates in livestock and crop sectors as 26% and 10%, 
respectively. Comparing these results to the findings of D&I approach reveals an 
expected result: ignoring indirect emissions in products hurts the effectiveness of BTAs 
and hence D_O approach finds less recovery impact of BTAs on emissions leakages in 
non-Annex I regions. 
Table 3.4 also shows a result consistent with findings of Burniaux et al. (2010). 
Like Burniaux et al. (2010), when considering all sectors (both agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors) our results show that BTAs are very effective in reducing emission 
leakage but their effectiveness decreases as coalition size increases. BTAs are capable to 
almost fully eliminate emission leakage when only EU27 regions abate their emissions: 
emission leakage reduces from 19% to 2%. However, when coalition expands from EU27 
to Annex 1, BTAs reduce leakage rates from 11% to 4%. 
 
                                                 
19
 In the model, it is assumed that the emissions intensity of imports is fixed. Under such assumption, BTAs 
cannot change behavior of exporters by promoting exporters to use less pollutant inputs (which reduces 
their emission intensity of their product). Therefore, in this study, the only way to reduce emissions for 
punished countries is to reduce their production. 
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Table 3.4 Emissions Leakage under 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax in All Sectors and Forest 














Annex1 16 47 45 32 11 
EU 16 54 52 39 19 
D&I 
Annex1_BTA 5 21 20 13 4 
EU_BTA -13 8 8 0.42 2 
D_only 
Annex1_BTA 10 27 26 19 6 
EU_BTA -4 17 17 9 6 
Note: “Only farm livestock” includes only primary livestock sectors (dairy, ruminant and non-
ruminant). All livestock includes both processed and unprocessed livestock sectors. 
 
When both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors are considered, Burniaux et al. 
(2010) find that leakage rates in scenarios EU noBTA and Annex I noBTA are 3.8% and 
4.4%, respectively. However, corresponding rates in this study are 19% and 11%, 
respectively. Mapping between Burniaux et al. and the GTAP-AEZ-GHG aggregation is 
not perfect. In Burniaux’s et al. study, the energy intensive industries (EIIs) are chemicals, 
metallurgic, other metal, iron and steel industry, paper and mining products. In GTAP-
AEZ-GHG aggregation, chemicals, metallurgic, other metal, iron and steel industry are 
clustered within En_Int_Ind. However, paper products sector is included in Oth_Ind_Se 
aggregate, and represents only small part of the aggregate. Mining is within OthPrimSect. 
However, fisheries which is not energy intensive industry, is also within OthPrimSect. 
Therefore, in this study, only En_Int_Ind is considered as EII sectors. 
Burniaux et al. (2010) described two channels of carbon leakage: international 
trade and fossil-fuel price. International trade related leakage occurs as emission-
intensive sectors in abating regions lose their market shares because of abatement policies 
to their rivals in non-abating regions. Fossil-fuel price related carbon leakage occurs as 
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carbon taxes in abating regions reduce domestic demand for fossil fuels and price of 
fossil fuel in global markets which leads to greater fossil fuels use and hence higher GHG 
emissions in non-abating regions. Therefore, Burniaux et al. explain the negative 
relationship between effectiveness of BTAs on leakage and coalition size by (1) under 
smaller coalitions, carbon leakage mostly occurs because of the international trade 
channel rather than the fossil-fuel price channel; and (2) BTAs address the former but not 
the latter channel. 
 When I decompose emission leakage, I find that, the nature of emission leakage 
does change over the coalition size (see Figure 3.14). In scenario EU without BTA, 18% 
carbon leakage breaks into 14% international trade channel and 4% fossil-fuel price 
channel. In scenario Annex1 without BTA, 11% total carbon leakage breaks into 6.8% 
international trade channel and 4.6% fossil-fuel price channel. The contribution of the 
fossil-fuel price channel to carbon leakage increases in absolute terms with coalition size, 
but is stable relative to the abatement target (it is about 5% in both EU and Annex I 
mitigation scenarios). The international trade channel remains the main channel of carbon 
leakage in my analysis as the coalition is expanded from EU to Annex I. However, 
relative contribution of the international trade channel is reduced as the coalition expands. 
Thus I find support for the Burniaux et al.’s (2010) observation that under smaller 
coalitions, carbon leakage mostly occurs because of the international trade channel rather 
than the fossil-fuel price channel. 
Further, in EU_BTA scenario, the leakage rate is almost eliminated completely 
and in Annex I_BTA leakage rate is reduced from 11% to 4%. Decomposition of the 
leakage rates in those scenarios shows that BTAs reduce leakage through the 
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international trade channel (negative blue bars) while leakage through fossil fuel prices 
increases in both EU_BTA and Annex1_BTA scenarios. Overall, I find a negative 
relationship between effectiveness of BTAs and coalition size, and my results support 
Burniaux et al.’s (2010) explanation for this negative relationship. 
 
Figure 3.12 Decomposition of Leakage Rate in All Sectors to International Trade-
Channel and Fossil Fuel Price-channel, Under 27$/tCO2eq Emission Tax on All Sectors 
and Forest Carbon Sequestration Incentive (%) 
 
 
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
In the model, it is assumed that commodities are differentiated according to their 
origin (Armington (1969)). Therefore, leakage rates are particularly sensitive to the 
values of Armington elasticities of substitution amongst imports from different sources. 
The size of international trade channel of emissions leakage is represented by the 
Armington elasticities. In this study, they are taken from the GTAP 6.2 database. The 
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used in this modeling work20. In this section, I explore how the emissions leakage rates in 
four different climate policies depend on the Armington elasticities when the values of 
the parameter are systematically increased and decreased by two standard deviations to 
higher and lower values. I do this to check the robustness of our results to the value of 
Armington elasticities. 
The overall sensitivity analysis shows that the results on the effectiveness of 
BTAs to control emissions leakage are robust to alternative values of Armington 
elasticities. As expected, leakage rates increase with increases in the Armington 
elasticities. As imported products become closer substitutes for the domestic goods, 
unilateral abatement policy implemented in the home country results in switch in the 
demand from domestic to imported product, expansion of production in non-participating 
countries, and increase in emission leakage. On the other hand, as domestic and imported 
products are less substitutable, the leakage rates are limited. For low Armington 
elasticities, the leakage rate in livestock sectors decreases from 47% to 30% in Annex I 
noBTA scenario and from 52% to 35% in EU noBTA scenario. Similarly, the leakage rate 
in crop sectors decreases from 16% to 10% in Annex I noBTA scenario and from 16% to 
11% in EU noBTA scenario. The results also reveal that BTAs become more effective at 
reducing emission leakage as the Armington elasticities decrease. In the Annex1case, in 
primary livestock sector for example, while emissions leakage rate decreases from 47% 
to 21% with BTAs in original Armington elasticities case, it decreases from 60% to 32% 
with BTAs and high Armington Elasticity. On the other hand, in the same scenario for 
                                                 
20
 See Table C3 for mapping between the 40 sectors in Hertel et al. (2007) and 29 sectors in my model.   
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low Armington Elasticities, the emission leakage rate decreases from 31% to 7% when 
BTAs are implemented. 
 
Table 3.5 Sensitivity Analysis of Leakage Rates with respect to Armington Elasticities 














16 47 45 32 11 
Annex1 BTA 5 21 20 13 4 
EU 16 54 52 39 19 




20 60 58 40 14 
Annex1 BTA 8 32 31 20 6 
EU 19 70 67 50 24 




10 31 30 21 8 
Annex1 BTA 0.5 7 7 4 3 
EU 11 36 35 26 14 
EU BTA -13 -7 -6 -9 0.1 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
As the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) negotiations have thus far 
failed to secure an extension of the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012, there is growing 
momentum for unilateral GHG emissions mitigation policies which should satisfy two 
conditions: (1) minimize home country loss of its market shares in the global markets; (2) 
minimize carbon leakage in global emissions. By design, simple GHG emissions 
abatement policies cannot satisfy these conditions and hence additional mechanisms such 
as Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs) are required. They allow individual countries or 
cohorts of countries to pursue unilateral market-based policies without harming their 
competitiveness while reducing the risks of leakage. 
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It is quite popular in the literature to measure the effectiveness of BTAs at 
competitiveness and leakage issues for manufacturing sectors under various abatement 
scenarios. However, no study making similar investigation in agricultural sectors is 
available. Considering the fact that those sectors are the significant sources of non-CO2 
emissions, understanding performance of BTAs in controlling competitiveness and 
emission leakage for those sectors is important. Therefore, the main goal of this essay is 
to fill this gap in the literature by assessing the impacts of BTAs on competitiveness and 
emissions leakage in livestock and crop sectors under different abatement scenarios. 
Furthermore, the sensitivity of these results to key model parameters such as Armington 
Elasticity and alternative emission content calculations is also tested. 
The results indicate that BTAs are quite an effective tool for controlling emissions 
leakage in agriculture and other sectors. Further, in some case these tools can even 
reverse emissions leakage. However, the same effectiveness of BTAs is not found with 
respect to competitiveness loss or welfare changes.  
Consistent with Burniaux’s et al. (2010) findings, I find that power of BTAs 
decreases with the coalition size, i.e., as the number of regions in a coalition for 
controlling their emissions increases effectiveness of BTAs at limiting emission leakage 
decreases. Decomposition of the leakage rates in the climate policy scenarios shows that 
BTAs reduce leakage through the international trade channel while leakage through 
fossil-fuel prices is unaffected in Annex I BTA scenario and even increases in EU BTA.    
Sensitivity analysis results with respect to the Armington elasticities show that the 
emissions leakage rates are quite robust to the changes in this parameter. However no 
such robustness is observed for the alternative carbon content calculations. Ignoring 
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indirect emissions embodied in imports changes dramatically the conclusions regarding 
the performance of BTAs in controlling emissions leakages. When both direct and 
indirect emissions are considered in emission content calculation the results show that 
BTAs are effective tools to almost eliminate emissions leakages in all sectors including 
livestock and crop sectors. However, when embodied emissions are underestimated by 
ignoring indirect emissions in products, the effectiveness of BTAs in fight with leakage 
seems to vanish. Therefore, I conclude that when assessing performance of emission-
based BTAs on economic and environmental variables, inclusion of indirect emissions 
into emission content calculation is crucial.  
 As a technical detail, on the other hand, measuring total direct and indirect 
emissions for each sector and for each region separately does not change the assessment 
results about the performance of BTAs. Thus, calculation of total direct and indirect 
emissions for each sector separately but for all regions together brings computational 







CHAPTER 4. EMISSION-BASED BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS VERSUS 
PUNITIVE TARIFFS: THEIR COMPARISON IN TERMS OF CREDIBILITY 
AND EFFECTIVENESS IN A GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION 
AGREEMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
Implementation of policies for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by a given 
country may increase domestic prices, induce international production displacement, and 
result in spatial relocation instead of reduction of GHG emissions; a phenomenon known 
as “emission leakage”. This loss of competitiveness without the corresponding 
environmental gain has deterred countries form implementing unilateral carbon 
abatement policies. Therefore policy measures that may prevent leakage have been 
considered as an important part of climate agreements. 
Two policy measures to address leakage widely discussed in the literature and 
policy forums are punitive tariffs and border tax adjustments. The former consist of a 
tariff imposed on all imports from countries that do not take appropriate measures to 
reduce emissions. These tariffs are decoupled from the specific carbon content of the 
imported good and are designed to punish free-riders. A border tax adjustment (BTA) is a 
tax levied by emission-abating countries on imports from non-abating countries 
according to the emissions associated with their production process.21  
                                                 
21
 This idea was incorporated into the Waxman/Markey bill (H.R.2454‘‘The American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009’’) as a requirement for purchasing ‘‘international reserve allowances’’ to cover goods 
imported from countries that have not undertaken adequate steps to mitigate GHG emissions (Section766). 
68 
 
While the consistency of BTAs with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules is 
still under debate (Biermann and Brohm, 2005; Brewer, 2010; Frankel, 2005; Goh, 2004; 
Hoerner, 1998) some authors argue in favor of the use of trade measures in the context of 
international environmental agreements specifically on the basis of efficiency gains 
accrued by their implementation (Stiglitz, 2006; Kopp and Pizer, 2007; Ismer and 
Neuhoff, 2007).22 An alternative argument underscores the importance of these measures 
to reduce “leakage” of emissions through spatial reallocation of carbon-intensive 
industries to low-tax countries and, as a corollary, to protect competitiveness in high-tax 
countries (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2008; Goh, 2004; Hoerner, 1998; Demailly and 
Quirion, 2008; Winchester, 2012). Other studies (Fischer and Fox, 2012; Bohringer et al., 
2010; Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2008; Babiker and Rutherford, 2005) have also compared 
emission-based BTAs to other border adjustments and domestic instruments (export 
rebates, full border adjustment, output-based rebating) on the basis of its effect on 
competitiveness (measured by net exports or domestic output) and overall emissions. 
A potentially important but typically overlooked benefit of implementing BTAs is 
associated with the fact that they may encourage free riders to join a greenhouse gas 
abatement agreement (Nordhaus, 1998; Brack et al., 2000; Hotelez, 2007; Charnovitz, 
2003). Although this hypothesis has been theoretically formalized (Barrett, 1997; Finus 
and Rundshagen; 2000), its empirical assessment remains limited.23 An empirical 
evaluation of this hypothesis involves quantification of welfare changes of countries in 
                                                 
22
 Stiglitz (2006) argues that this is consistent with World Trade Organization rules because products from 
countries that allow unconstrained emissions are implicitly subsidized. Perez (2005) analyses the legality of 
trade sanctions in this context and concludes that the WTO will not interfere with such tariffs. 
 
23
 Kemfert (2004) analyses the effectiveness of trade measures to sustain an environmental agreement. 
However this study only considers banning trade and does not discuss punitive tariffs or BTAs. 
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the context of a climate agreement including BTAs imposed on free riders. In fact, the 
welfare measures presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation demonstrate that BTAs are 
effective in shifting burden of abatement from acting regions to non-acting regions (see 
Table 3.3). Hübler (2011) considers a situation in which abating countries impose BTAs 
equal to the domestic carbon tax and measures their impact on the welfare of punished 
countries’ (all developing countries) with particular emphasis on China. Weitzel and 
Peterson (2011) also analyze the impact of BTAs (assumed equal to domestic carbon 
price resulting from a cap and trade system) on the welfare of free riders but does not 
compare this with the level of welfare those countries would achieve under cooperation 
with the climate agreement. Finally Manders and Veenendaal (2008) consider welfare 
implications of the imposition of BTAs (equivalent to the prevailing carbon tax rate) on 
free riders by Annex I countries in the Kyoto Protocol. However the analysis does not 
explicitly considers USA’s incentives to participate but rather simply assumes its 
participation or lack thereof. 
These studies did not consider the incentive compatibility of a climate agreement 
including BTAs for the two largest emitters in the world: the United States and China.  
The lack of abatement efforts by these countries seriously undermines the efficiency of 
any international climate agreement. The efficiency and competitiveness implications of 
China’s lack of abatement efforts have been stated as reasons for the USA’s failure to 
comply with an international climate agreement. The objective of the present study is to 
conduct empirical assessment of the hypothesis that trade sanctions in the form of BTAs, 
used by the U.S. against China, may constitute a viable enforcement mechanism to 
sustain compliance with a range of emissions targets in the context of agreements to curb 
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global GHG emissions. The case of trade sanctions between USA and China is 
particularly relevant due to the strength and magnitude of the bilateral trade flow. In 
addition considering the fact that the Chinese economy is both emissions as well as 
export intensive, the U.S. may potentially induce China to abate GHGs through the use of 
BTAs.  
Empirical assessment of our hypothesis requires consideration of strategic 
behavior. Border adjustments (regardless of whether they are designed to induce 
cooperation by free riders or simply as a leakage reduction tool) are implemented only if 
coalition countries are better off after their implementation and will prevent free riding if 
and only if non-signatory countries are better off implementing the carbon reduction 
policy than not implementing it and facing border adjustments. Game theory has 
formalized both conditions and labeled them the credibility and the effectiveness 
conditions respectively.  
Assessment of the viability of BTAs as a free riding deterrent mechanism requires 
estimation of the effect of these policies on markets’ equilibrium. Markets all over the 
world are interconnected (e.g. commodities, food, energy) and, when policies have the 
ability to significantly change terms of trade and the flow of goods across borders, 
estimation of market effects of policies requires a general equilibrium approach. A 
general equilibrium model is employed to calculate the range of carbon taxes that can be, 
credibly and effectively, supported by emission-based BTAs and assess its sensitivity to 
technological parameters (i.e. Armington elasticities). From a range of viable emission-
based BTAs the most cost-effective level is identified (i.e. the level that maximizes the 
punisher’s equivalent variation). I then compare the merits of emission-based BTAs (in 
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terms of stability and cost-effectiveness) relative to a widely speculated alternative which 
has been evaluated in the literature (Barrett, 2003; Perez, 2005; Stiglitz, 2006; Perez, 
2007) and Chapter 2 of this dissertation, namely punitive tariff. 
Evaluating the hypothesis that BTAs could help deter free riding should shed light 
into many questions that remain open in the scientific literature: (1) Can emission-based 
BTAs be used as a viable (i.e. credible and effective) enforcement mechanism for 
international GHG mitigation agreements and what are the carbon tax levels that can be 
supported through its implementation? (2) What are the environmental and market 
implications of ignoring indirect emissions in taxing imports? (3) How do emission-based 
BTAs compare, on the basis of its stability and cost-effectiveness as an enforcement 
mechanism, with alternative mechanisms such as punitive tariffs? (4) What is the most 
cost-effective level of emission-based BTAs? 
 
4.2 Methodology 
One of the goals of this chapter is compare the results found here with the results 
of Chapter 2. Therefore, to be consistent with Chapter 2, the model and the game 
structure used in Chapter 2 is used in this chapter, as well. Namely, the analysis employs 
the GTAP-AEZ-GHG model with the GTAP Version 6 Database aggregated up to 3 
regions and 24 sectors.  
The only modification made to the original model is introduction of BTAs 
described in detail in Appendix C. To calculate the embodied emissions of products 
which is required to determine the BTAs, the D&I approach is used which is described in 
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detail in Chapter 3. This approach calculates the emissions embodied in products as the 
total of direct and indirect emissions for each sector and region separately.  
For the game structure, the same three-stage game used in Chapter 2 is also used 
in this chapter. In Stage 1, the U.S. and ROW implement a mitigation policy and China 
plays a default strategy of no emissions reduction. In Stage 2, the U.S. observes China’s 
free-ridding and threatens it by imposing BTAs on all imports from China. In Stage 3, 
China observes the global emissions tax level and the BTA threat from the U.S. and 








Figure 4.1 The Game Tree 
 
Welfare changes are used to measure the payoffs of the regions. The GTAP-AEZ-
GHG model is employed to quantify welfare and total emission changes associated with 
different combinations of strategies considered in the analysis. Concept of equivalent 
variation (EV) is applied to measure changes in the welfare of the regions24. Thus,  
, D, 	, 
                                                 
24
 In the model, the regional household’s EV is equal to the difference between the expenditure required to 
obtain new (post-simulation) level of utility at initial prices and initial expenditure. McDougall (2001) 
documents EV calculation in the GTAP model. 
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is the equivalent variation of region 
		{, , } when the emissions tax set by 
the U.S. and ROW is , the percentage change in the power of import tariffs25 imposed 
by the U.S. on Chinese imports if China free-rides is D		[0,∞	, and China’s action 
given the U.S.’s threat is 		 = 	 {
	
 , !"#$%}. 
 
4.3 Results 
To assess the credibility of a tariff threat we start by assuming a stringent 
abatement policy and ask whether imposition of BTAs on Chinese imports (if China free 
rides) constitutes a credible threat. We do this by assuming that the global emissions tax 
is $20 per ton of carbon equivalent (TCE) and calculating EV for the U.S. at $1/TCE 
increments in the BTAs.  
In addition, we assume that the marginal damage from pollution is $10/TCE.26 
Unlike the methodology used in Chapter 2 for punitive tariffs, in this chapter marginal 
damages of pollution is also taken into account. The reason for such modification is 
further discussed later in this section. It should also be noted that in this essay it is not 
assumed that marginal damage of pollution in China should equal the corresponding 
emissions tax as marginal damages are heterogeneous under free riding.  
Marginal damages are factored in the EV calculation by using the following 
procedure. At a given emissions tax 	, and marginal damage of pollution τ, a BTA 
imposed by the U.S. against Chinese products is incentive compatible for the U.S. when 
                                                 
25
 Power of a tax, by definition, is the ratio of the price with tax over the price without tax, i.e., equal to the 
tax rate plus one. Thus, if the power of tax is greater than one, the implemented rate is really a tax, and 
when the power of tax is less than one, the implemented rate is a subsidy. 
 
26
 The choice of this marginal damage will be discussed in further detail below. 
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the cost of implementing the threat is lower than its benefits, rendering a higher 
equivalent variation to the U.S. That is 
()*FGH, D = 0, 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	 − I
∗ [KLM, D, 

 	 − KLM, D = 0, !"#$%	] 
and 
KLM, D, 	 = 	 N KL, D, 	
∈PQR
 
KLM, D, 	 is the global GHG emissions which is the sum of regional GHG 
emissions KL, D, 	 when emissions tax is c, China’s action is a, and level of 
threat is BTA. The impact of damage of pollution on U.S.’s welfare is determined by the 
marginal cost of pollution (I) and difference between the baseline global emissions and 
global emissions when USA punishes 
(KLM, D > 0, 

 	 − KLM, D = 0, !"#$%	). When the credibility 
condition is rearranged according to these equalities, we obtain 
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Similarly, a BTA imposed by the U.S. against Chinese products is effective if 
China achieves a higher EV when complying with the global GHG mitigation agreement 
than free riding and receiving the punishment from the U.S. That is 
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678FGH, D = 0, !"#$%	 = 678, D = 0, !"#$%	 
where KLM, D = 0, !"#$%	 is the global GHG emissions under global 
mitigation agreement (because China complies) and KLM, D > 0, 

 	 is 
the global GHG emissions when China free rides and receives BTA level of punishment. 
The impact of damage of pollution on China’s welfare, on the other hand, is determined 
by the marginal damage of pollution (I) and difference between the global emissions 
when USA punishes China’s free-ride at the given level of BTA (KLM, D >
0, 

 	) and global emissions when China complies (KLM, D =
0, !"#$%	). When these equalities are inserted into the effectiveness condition we 
obtain 
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Figure 4.2 shows how the U.S.’s EV changes with the BTAs imposed on Chinese 
imports under $10/TCE marginal cost of pollution. Results reveal that any BTA above 
$139/TCE reduces the U.S. welfare to a level lower than in the scenario without BTAs 
(black line in Figure 4.2). These figures suggest that, under an emission tax of $20/TCE 
and the marginal damage from pollution is $10/TCE, the threat of BTAs is credible as 
long as they do not exceed $139/TCE. Figure 4.2 illustrates the concept of credibility. 
However the maximum level of BTAs at or below which a threat is credible will likely 
change as the level of the carbon tax changes. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 USA's EV ($ US million) for a Range of BTAs under $20/TCE Emissions Tax 
and $10/TCE Marginal Damage from Pollution 
 
We also verify the effectiveness of a BTA threat by initially assuming that the 
global emissions tax is $20/TCE and varying the BTAs in $1/TCE increments. Figure 4.3 
illustrates China’s EV for a range of BTAs imposed by the U.S. on all imports from 
China when marginal cost of pollution is $10/TCE. As the U.S. increases the BTA level 
China’s EV decreases. However, up to $20/TCE BTA, China’s welfare loss due to the 





























words, under the assumption that both ROW and the U.S. are taxing emissions at 
$20/TCE in all sectors and provide forest carbon sequestration incentives at that carbon 
price, BTAs at or above $20/TCE can induce China to comply with the abatement 
agreement and impose a $20/TCE tax on its own emissions. Therefore, $20/TCE is the 
minimum BTA that is effective at the given emission tax. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 China's EV (USD million) for a Range of BTAs under $20/TCE Emission Tax 
and $10 Marginal Damage from Pollution 
 
When results illustrated in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 are brought together, we find that 
under an emission tax of $20/TCE and marginal damage of pollution of $10/TCE, BTAs 
between $20/TCE and $139/TCE constitute both credible and effective threats and may, 
thus, be used as a viable enforcement mechanism in an international environmental 
agreement. However, it is unclear if the existence of BTA levels that are both credible 





































effective threats depends upon the level of the carbon tax then it is of the upmost 
importance to calculate the maximum carbon tax that can be enforced with BTAs. 
We analyze the systematic link between carbon taxes and credible and effective 
BTAs that can enforce them by repeating the analysis of Figures 4.2 and 4.3 for a range 
of emissions taxes. Combinations of emissions taxes and BTAs for which a threat is both 
credible and effective are displayed in Figure 4.4. Calculation of credible and effective 
BTAs requires assumptions on the marginal damage from pollution faced by the US and 
China. When the marginal damage of pollution is assumed to be zero, Figure 4.4 reveals 
that $21.50/TCE is the maximum enforceable emissions tax (MET), i.e., the point at 
where the credibility and effectiveness curves intersect each other. Current CO2 price in 
the EU market is around €7 which makes carbon (C) price around $35/TCE with 
exchange rate 1.32 $/€. This means that the current emissions tax in the real world is 
already above the MET under zero marginal damage of pollution. 
Figure 4.4 depicts the boundaries of the effectiveness set when marginal damage 
from pollution is $5/TCE, $10/TCE, and $15/TCE. These figures for marginal damage 
from pollution are taken from Nordhaus (2011). Nordhaus presents estimates of marginal 
damage of pollution faced by China under six different scenarios. These scenarios 
capture a range of time horizons and discount rates. In particular marginal damage 
estimates range from $3/TCE to $20/TCE, with a mean of about $10/TCE. Values chosen 
here range from $0/TCE to $15/TCE to assess the robustness of our conclusions to 
assumptions on those estimates. Combinations of tax rates and BTAs above these 
boundaries achieve effectiveness; i.e. China is better off complying and avoiding the 
BTA than free riding and receiving the punishment. Therefore the boundaries depict the 
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minimum BTA that can convince China to comply at a given emission tax. The 
effectiveness curves are convex and monotonically increasing. This is an expected result 
considering the fact that as the environmental policy becomes more stringent it becomes 
more costly for China to abate and hence the minimum BTA that can induce China to 
abate increases. 
The credibility curve is also depicted in Figure 4.4. This curve represents the 
maximum BTA that the U.S. is willing to implement against China at different levels of 
carbon tax. The combinations of tax rates and BTAs below that line fulfill the credibility 
condition; i.e. the U.S. is better off implementing the BTA than not implementing it when 
China is free riding. Interestingly, the range of BTAs that are credible is insensitive to the 
level of the carbon tax.  
As revealed by this figure, the set of effective threats is highly sensitive to the 
marginal damage from pollution. In particular, Figure 4.4 shows that as damages from 
pollution are factored in, the effectiveness curve is shifted downwards. This is because 
China’s welfare under free riding is not only decreased by the BTA but also by the 
damage from additional pollution. The credibility line is slightly affected by the size of 
marginal damages. As the marginal damage of pollution increases the credibility line 
shifts upward (see table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1 Credibility Thresholds under Different Marginal Damage of Pollution ($/TCE) 
Marginal Damage of 







The intersection between the credibility and effectiveness curves indicates the 
maximum carbon tax for which there still exist at least one level of BTA that can credible 
and effectively enforce such tax rate. Let us define this intersection as the maximum 
enforceable (with BTAs) carbon tax, MET. As revealed by results in Figure 4.4 the MET 
increases as the marginal damage from pollution increases. In other words, as the 
marginal damage from pollution increases, BTAs become a viable enforcement 
mechanism for increasingly stringent carbon policies. Moreover the effect of marginal 
cost of pollution on MET increases as marginal cost increases. According to Figure 4.4 a 
$5/TCE increase in marginal cost of pollution from $0 to $5/TCE increases MET by $8 
(from $22/TCE to $30/TCE). However a $5/TCE increase in marginal cost of pollution 
from $10 to $15/TCE increases MET by $13 (from $40/TCE to $53/TCE). 
An additional legal constraint may limit the range of BTAs that the punishing 
country can impose.27 As discussed by Fischer and Fox (2012) the National Treatment 
principle embedded in Article III of the GATT requires that imported goods be treated no 
less favorably than “like” domestic products. Many scholars interpret this to mean that 
the BTA cannot exceed the domestic carbon tax and assume a BTA that is equal to the 
carbon tax (e.g. Hübler, 2011; Weitzel and Peterson, 2011; Fischer and Fox, 2012). This 
is, however, hardly a definitive interpretation of the rules and regulations as the general 
exceptions clause in Article XX may provide some leniency to punishing countries. This 
clause recognizes exceptions when, among other reasons, “necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health” and “necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provision of this Agreement”.  Moreover 
                                                 
27
 This legal constraint applies to BTAs but not, for instance, punitive tariffs. 
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the overall carbon tax imposed on imports is determined by the product of the carbon 
intensity estimated and the tax rate applied. Even if the latter cannot surpass the domestic 
carbon price, the former is also a policy choice. Therefore there is technically no limit to 
a BTA as the “effective” border adjustment can be scaled up or down by changing the 
estimated carbon intensity.  
To consider a situation in which the BTA is forced to equal the domestic carbon 
tax, a 45 degree line is depicted in Figure 4.4. The most important question here is 
whether the 45 degree line is contained inside the boundaries of credible and effective 
BTAs or not. If it is contained, then there exist at least one level of BTA that is credible 
and effective and can be considered in compliance with the strictest interpretation of 
GATT’s rules. Figure 4.4 shows that the 45 degree line is not contained in the credibility 
and effectiveness set when marginal damage from pollution is zero. This is to be 
expected. The punished country is better off free riding and accepting a BTA since this 
only affects its exports. Complying and imposing a carbon tax would affect its entire 
production. It also indicates that if players follow GATT and China does not care about 
pollution, then set of credible and effective BTAs is null. 
It is evident from Figure 4.4 that the 45 degree line will be contained in the 
credible and effective set for a high enough marginal damage of pollution. A key value 
here is the minimum marginal damage for which the intersection between the credibility 
and effectiveness set and the 45 degree line would be non-empty. Our calculations 
indicate that such value is equal to $2.09/TCE which is calculated by  
I = 	 678 = 1, D = 0, 

 	 −	678 = 1, D = 0, !"#$%	KLM = 1, D = 0, 

 	 − KLM = 1, D = 0, !"#$%			 
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This result is encouraging as it reveals that BTAs may constitute a viable (i.e. credible 
and effective) enforcement mechanism even if legally constrained to be equal to the 
domestic carbon tax.  
A less optimistic view emerges when the issue becomes the maximum carbon tax 
that can be credibly and effectively supported by a legally constrained BTA. Let us 
denote this tax rate by METL. As shown in Figure 4, when the marginal damage from 
pollution is $5/TCE, the maximum carbon tax that can be enforced with BTAs (i.e. the 
METL) is $7/TCE; not a highly stringent carbon policy by most standards. The METL is, 
however, highly sensitive to the marginal damage from pollution. In fact, when marginal 
damage is $10/TCE, the METL increases from $7/TCE to $20/TCE and when marginal 
damage is $15/TCE, the METL is $37/TCE. 
 
Figure 4.4 Credible and Effective BTAs under Different Emissions Taxes and Marginal 






























Results in Figure 4.4 also reveal that the set of credible and effective threats 
shrinks, in all scenarios, as the emission tax increases and becomes empty beyond MET. 
Therefore our results suggest a potential trade-off between stability and efficiency; i.e. 
the set of credible and effective threats is diminished or may even disappear if complete 
internalization of external damages from GHG emissions requires an abatement level 
higher than that provided by MET. 
Another goal of this work is to assess the cost-effective levels of BTAs for the 
U.S. The threshold for the credibility condition is the maximum BTA at which the U.S. is 
better of applying the punishment. However, it is also important to determine the cost-
effective BTA for the U.S. economy which is the BTA at which the U.S. achieves the 
lowest welfare loss because of the GHG mitigation and punishment. Note that in this 
study optimal BTA cannot be determined because it requires determination of optimal 
emission tax which we do not conduct. In our analysis, we determine carbon-based BTAs 
that are both credible and effective at a given level of emission tax. Therefore, 
determination of the carbon tax that achieves efficiency is not a part of this analysis. The 
cost-effective threats used by the U.S. against China over a range of emissions taxes is 
$65/TCE (see Figure 4.4).  
So far, we have discussed the importance of the existence of BTAs that are both 
credible and effective but our analysis has remained silent regarding the “best” level of 
BTA within this set. By definition, the punisher country will prefer to impose the cost-
effective BTA if possible. It is important to note that, the punisher country will be able to 
implement the cost effective level of BTA if such rate is below the credibility and above 
the effectiveness thresholds. Though the cost-effective BTA is always (i.e. for all levels 
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of carbon tax) below the credibility threshold it may or may not be above the 
effectiveness threshold depending on the level of the carbon tax. In particular there is a 
maximum carbon tax (where the cost-effectiveness line intersects the credibility threshold) 
above which the cost-effective BTA is not high enough to constitute an effective threat. 
On the other hand, Figure 4.4 suggests that as the marginal damage from pollution 
increases so does the range of carbon taxes for which the cost-effective BTA constitutes 
an effective and credible threat. 
Finally, the 45 degree line and the cost-effective BTA line never intersect within 
the credible and effective set of BTAs for marginal damages 15$/TCE and below. Even 
at a marginal damage from pollution of $15/TCE the lines do not intersect within this set. 
This means that if indeed the rules of GATT preclude the imposition of BTAs above the 
domestic carbon tax, then the United States cannot rely on the cost-effective BTA to 
induce China to comply. In order to conduct a credible threat the US will be forced to 
threat China with a BTA higher than the cost-effective. This is, however, not of great 
concern because, as long as the threat is credible and effective, the US will never have to 
actually implement the threat. Therefore no welfare losses have to be incurred in when 
using BTAs as enforcement mechanism for an international climate agreement. 
 
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
Our model employs an Armington specification of international trade (Armington, 
1969), and commodities produced in different regions are imperfect substitutes28. The 
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econometric estimates of the Armington elasticities provided in Hertel et al. (2007) are 
used in this modeling work. In this section, we explore how the thresholds of BTAs and 
emissions tax depend on the Armington elasticities when the values of the parameter are 
systematically increased and decreased by two standard deviations to higher and lower 
values. We do this to check the robustness of our results to the value of Armington 
elasticities. It is found that when marginal damage of pollution is not taken into account 
the qualitative pattern of the thresholds of BTAs and emission taxes are quite robust to 
alternative values of the Armington elasticities (see Table 4.2).29 
 
Table 4.2 Thresholds of BTA and Emissions Tax under Varying Armington Elasticities 
Trade elasticities Emissions tax ($/TCE)  BTA ($/TCE) 
Mean 21.50 137 
High 18.50 126 
Low 23.50 148 
 
Figure 4.5 presents how the set of credible and effective trade threats changes 
when the Armington elasticities are changed by two standard deviations estimated by 
Hertel et al. (2007). For now, the damage of pollution is ignored. As revealed by Figure 
4.5, the increase in Armington elasticities shrinks the size of credible and effective threats. 
As the Armington elasticities increase, commodities with different origins become more 
substitutable and hence the market power effect of BTAs vanishes. In such case, a BTA 
by $126/TCE imposed by the U.S. on Chinese imports is the limit for a BTA to stay both 
credible and effective.  
                                                 
29
 To detect difference in BTAs at low and high Armington elasticities, we used step ¢50/TCE. 
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Conversely, when the Armington elasticities are low, BTA threats to China are 
both credible and effective as long as the BTA does not increase by more than $148/TCE  
and the emissions tax is not higher than $23.50/TCE (see Table 4.2). As the commodities 
from different origins become less substitutable, captured by a reduction in Armington 
elasticities, impact of BTAs on terms of trade increases and hence the set of both credible 
and effective BTA threats expands from $137/TCE to $148/TCE and from $21.50/TCE 
to $23.50/TCE in emissions tax. 
 
Figure 4.5 Sensitivity of Credibility and Effectiveness Conditions to Changes in 
Armington Elasticities 
 
When marginal damage of pollution is taken into account, the response of 
effectiveness condition to changes in Armington elasticity quite changes. As revealed by 
Figure 4.6, $10/TCE marginal cost of pollution is large enough to change the order of 
effectiveness conditions with different Armington elasticities. When the marginal damage 































at the top of the other two cases (Mean and Low). However, when $10/TCE marginal 
damage is taken into account, the effectiveness curve with high Armington elasticity 
shifts to very bottom. In this new case, the effectiveness curve with low Armington 
elasticity locates at the top of the other two case (Mean and High).  
As shown previous section, as damages from pollution are factored in, the 
effectiveness curve is shifted downwards. This is because China’s welfare under free 
riding is not only decreased by the BTA but also by the damage from additional pollution. 
Figure 4.6 shows that downward shift impact of marginal damage of pollution increases 
as the Armington elasticity increases. As the Armington elasticity increases, the products 
from different origin becomes close substitute, and hence welfare loss of China because 
of damage from additional pollution increases. Thus, the downward shift impact of 
abatement cost on effectiveness condition increases. As a result, when $10/TCE marginal 
damage of pollution is taken into account, the smallest shift in effectiveness curve occurs 
in low Armington elasticity case. It is followed by mean and high Armington elasticity 
cases. This is an expected result, considering the fact that  
To sum up, when cost of pollution is ignored, an increase in Armington elasticity 
shifts the effectiveness curve upward. When cost of pollution is included, while the 
effectiveness curve shifts upward because of increase in Armington elasticity, the curve 
shifts downward because of damage from pollution. And the second effect increases with 
Armington elasticity. The latter effect offsets the former resulting in a downward shift in 




Figure 4.6 Sensitivity of Effectiveness Condition to Changes in Armington Elasticity 
under $10/TCE Marginal Damage of Pollution 
 
Figure 4.7 presents how the set of credible and effective trade threats changes 
when the Armington elasticities are changed by two standard deviations and marginal 
damage of pollution is equal to $10/TCE. . As revealed by Figure 4.5, the increase in 
Armington elasticities shifts both the credibility and effectiveness lines. This does not, 
however, cause any substantial effect on the size of the set of credible and effective 
threats. This is because while an increase in elasticities shifts the credibility threshold 
down (reducing the size of the set of credible and effective threats and the MET) it also 
shifts the effectiveness threshold downward. The latter effect offsets the former and 
results in about the same MET ($41.5/TCE). Similarly a reduction in Armington 
elasticities shifts the credibility curve up and the effectiveness thresholds inward resulting 
in about the same MET. Changes in elasticities do, however, have an impact on the level 































elasticities make a lower BTA ($129/TCE) sufficient to enforce a climate agreement. 
Under lower elasticities, on the other hand, a BTA of $150/TCE is required to enforce the 
agreement. Results in Figure 4.7 then suggest that our findings regarding the maximum 
carbon tax that can be enforced with BTAs is quite robust to Armington elasticities 




Figure 4.7 Sensitivity of Credibility and Effectiveness Conditions to Changes in 
Armington Elasticities under $10/TCE Marginal Damage from Pollution 
 
 
4.5 Comparison of BTA and Punitive Tariffs 
In this section we compare two types of trade sanctions widely discussed in the 
literature on the basis of their ability to credibly and effectively enforce a climate 
agreement: punitive tariffs and BTAs. We assess such ability based on the MET that each 
























and assuming a $10/TCE marginal damage from carbon emissions, the MET is $58/TCE 
(Figure 4.6). This is significantly higher than the MET supported by BTAs under the 
same assumptions on marginal damage of pollution ($40/TCE). This results suggests that 
punitive tariffs seem a more viable enforcement mechanism than BTAs. 
 
Figure 4.8 Credible and Effective Changes in Power of Punitive Tariffs, Under Different 
Emissions Taxes and $10/TCE marginal cost of pollution 
 
Moreover when potential legal constraints to BTAs are added (i.e. only those 
combinations of carbon tax and BTAs on the 45 degree line are feasible) then the 
maximum enforceable tax under legal constraints (i.e. METL) is $18/TCE. This is 
consistent with previous arguments (Stiglitz, 2006) linking the use of trade sanctions with 
overall economic efficiency. If rules in GATT do not allow for BTAs above and beyond 
domestic carbon taxes, then their power as a mechanism to induce cooperation and 
internalize pollution externalities may be compromised. Therefore rules and regulations 
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result in unintended consequences such that efficiency is reduced due to failure to 
internalize an externality. 
Another interesting result is that with no damages of pollution considered in the 
analysis and under the assumption that BTAs are equalized to the corresponding emission 
tax the set of BTAs that are both credible and effective is empty. To satisfy both 
credibility and effectiveness conditions, BTAs should be significantly greater than the 
corresponding emission tax. This suggests that punitive tariff may be more effective than 
BTAs in achieving stable international environmental agreements. The reason for this 
result may be that in the modeling framework used in this essay, the emission intensity of 
imports is assumed to be fixed and independent from changes in production practices in 
non-Annex I. If the flexible emission intensities were used producers in China could react 
to BTAs and could change their production practices. US instantaneously would revise 
carbon content of imports coming from China. Then, for each level of damages the 
effectiveness curve would be flatter and BTAs would support higher emission tax. To 
sum up, the fixed emission intensities method (“direct + indirect” in this case) used to 
compute the embodied emissions in imports may not be a correct choice for this research.  
Another possible explanation for the punitive tariffs being more effective than 
BTAs may be the nonlinearity of welfare losses under BTAs. Imposing tax on value (as 
in the punitive tariff case) has different implications than taxing emissions (as in the BTA 
case). Punitive tariffs are ad valorem taxes which are uniformly applied on all imports 
from China to the U.S. BTAs are on the other hand emission based taxes whose 
corresponding change in power of tariff can vary across the sectors dramatically (see 
McKibben and Wilcoxen (2008) for the estimate of ad valorem tariff rates across the 
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sectors of $20/TCE and $40/TCE BTAs). The reason is that conversion of BTAs to a 
change in power of import tariffs is a function of BTA level (uniform across goods) and 
emission intensity (good specific). Since emission intensity of “clean” sectors is smaller 
than “dirty” sectors’, corresponding change in power of tariff is smaller for clean sectors 
than dirty sectors. This variation across the sectors creates potentially larger efficiency 
losses for the U.S. and smaller efficiency losses for China compared to the punitive tariffs 
case. This implies that at a given emission tax, a BTA is less credible and effective that a 
punitive tariff which is equal to the average of the corresponding power of tariff increase 
of that given BTA. As a result BTAs lead to smaller set of viable threats than punitive 
tariffs.   
 
4.6 Conclusions 
Previous studies have proposed the use of trade sanctions as enforcement 
mechanisms in the context of international environmental agreements. The present study 
aimed at evaluating the hypothesis that border tax adjustments could help deter free 
riding. The analysis also compares the performance of BTAs relative to punitive tariffs in 
terms of their ability to successfully (credibly and effectively) enforce a wide range of 
carbon taxes. A three stage game played by the US (the punisher) and China (the 
punished) is the vehicle through which analysis of these issues was conducted. Because 
payoffs are the result of displacements in world markets caused by climate policies, a 
general equilibrium model is used to empirically implement the three stage game. 
Results suggest that BTAs may in fact be used as viable (i.e. credible and 
effective) enforcement mechanism for international GHG mitigation agreements. 
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However the maximum level of carbon tax that can be enforced varies dramatically with 
two factors: the marginal damage of pollution perceived by Chinese authorities and the 
legal limitations that GATT rules may impose on BTAs. As the marginal damage from 
pollution perceived by the Chinese government increases, the maximum enforceable 
carbon tax also increases, and significantly so. In fact when marginal damage from 
pollution is $10/TCE (the average of estimates in Nordhaus, 2011) the maximum 
enforceable carbon tax (without legal constraints on BTAs) is $40/TCE. A rather 
stringent abatement policy. On the other hand if BTAs are legally constrained to equal 
domestic carbon taxes, the maximum enforceable carbon tax drops to $18/TCE. 
Under the aforementioned legal constraints on the level of BTA, if China faces a 
marginal damage of pollution of $5/TCE (the lower end of Nordhaus, 2011 range of 
estimates) the maximum enforceable carbon tax is only $6/TCE. Moreover, if the 
marginal damage is below $2/TCE there is no positive carbon tax that can be successfully 
enforced by BTAs. All these results seem robust to assumptions on Armington elasticities 
used by the GTAP-AEZ-GHG model. 
If BTAs are not in fact constrained to be equal to domestic carbon tax (possibly 
exploiting exceptions foreseen in GATT’s article XX) then the power of BTA as a 
potential enforcement mechanism is greatly enhanced. But while BTAs seem a promising 
enforcement mechanism in the context of climate agreements (particularly if no legal 
constraints force BTAs to equal domestic carbon taxes) they do not seem to fare well 
when compared to punitive tariffs. In fact punitive tariffs seem to be capable of 
supporting a much larger maximum carbon tax. In particular punitive tariffs can viably 
(credibly and effectively) enforce a carbon tax as high as $58/TCE. However punitive 
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tariffs may be more incompatible with GATT rules than BTAs are. Therefore both types 
of trade sanctions should be considered as potential enforcement mechanisms in the 
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Appendix A  Additional Table and Figures for Chapter 2 
Table A 1 EV of the U.S. under Different Level of Emission Taxes when China free rides 
but the U.S. does not punish (USD 2001 million) 
Emission Tax 














Table A 2 EV of China under Different Level of Emission Taxes when China complies 
with the Agreement (USD 2001 million) 
Emission Price 

















Appendix B Is it accurate to measure the total of direct and indirect emissions for each 
sector separately but for all regions together? 
To save on computing time, the total of direct and indirect emissions might be 
calculated for each sector separately but for all regions together (instead of calculating for 
each region and sector separately, as in the case of D&I approach). Such alternative 
method saves time on computing because it requires to run only 29 simulations (one for 
each sector). The D&I method, on the other hand requires 19x29 simulations (one for 
each sector and region combination).  
Recall that producers combine imported and domestic input into the composite 
intermediate input. Therefore, in this alternative approach, it is inherently assumed that 
share of imported intermediate input within the composite intermediate input is small and 
regions employ in production mostly domestically produced intermediate inputs. The 
assumption allows to measure emissions embodied in good i produced in each region of 
the model by doubling output of sector i in all regions together. The limitation of the 
approach is that emissions attributable to good i produced in region r include not only 
emissions embodied in good i in that regions, but also emissions due to production of the 
same good in all other regions of the model. This happens due to the production of 
intermediate inputs (and respective emissions) in the considered region r that are exported 





Appendix C Additional Table and Figures for Chapter 3 
Table C 1 Aggregation of GTAP regions 
Code Region in the model GTAP regions Group 
USA United States United States Annex I 
EU27 European Union 27 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, United 
Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria 
Annex I  
BRAZIL Brazil Brazil Non-Annex I 
CAN Canada Canada Annex I  
JAPAN Japan Japan Annex I  
CHIHKG China, Hong Kong China, Hong Kong Non-Annex I 
INDIA India India Non-Annex I 
C_C_Amer Central and Caribbean Americas 
Mexico, Rest of North America, 
Central America, Rest of Free Trade 
Area of the Americas, Rest of the 
Caribbean 
Non-Annex I 
S_O_Amer South and Other Americas 
Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Rest of 
Andean Pact, Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay, Rest of South America 
Non-Annex I  
E_Asia East Asia Korea, Taiwan, Rest of East Asia Non-Annex I 
Mala_Indo Malaysia and Indonesia Indonesia, Malaysia Non-Annex I 
R_SE_Asia Rest of South East Asia Philippines,  Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, Rest of Southeast Asia Non-Annex I 
R_S_Asia Rest of South Asia Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Rest of South Asia Non-Annex I 
RUSSIA Russia Russian Federation Annex I 
Oth_CEE_CIS Other East Europe and Rest 
of Former Soviet Union 
Rest of Former Soviet Union, 
Turkey, Albania, Croatia, Rest of 
Europe 
Non-Annex I 
Oth_Europe Rest of European Countries Switzerland, Rest of EFTA Annex I 
MEAS_NAfr Middle East and North Africa 
Rest of Middle East, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Rest of North Africa Non-Annex I 
S_S_AFR Sub Saharan Africa  
Botswana, South Africa, Rest of 
South African Customs Union, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rest of 
Southern African Development 
Community, Madagascar, Uganda, 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 
Non-Annex I 




Table C 2 Aggregation of GTAP sectors 
Code Sector in the model GTAP commodities 
Paddy_Rice Paddy Rice pdr 
Wheat Wheat wht 
CrGrains Coarse grains gro 
Oilseeds Oil seeds osd 
Sugar_Crop Sugar cane, sugar beet c_b 
OthAgri Other agriculture goods v_f, pfb, ocr 
Forestry Forestry frs 
Dairy Raw milk rmk 
Ruminant meat Cattel, sheep, goat, horses ctl, wol 
Non Ruminant meat Non-ruminant livestock oap 
Proc_Dairy Processed dairy products mil 
Proc_Rum Processed ruminant meat products cmt 
Proc_NonRum Processed non-ruminant meat products omt 
vol Vegetable oils and fats vol 
Bev_Sug Beverages, tobaco, sugar sgr, b_t 
Proc_Rice Processed Rice pcr 
Ofd Food products n.e.c. ofd 
OthPrimSect OtherPrimary: Fishery & Mining fsh, omn 
Coal Coal coa 
Oil Crude Oil oil 
Gas Natural gas gas, gdt 
Oil_Pcts Petroleum p_c 
Electricity Electricity ely 
En_Int_Ind Energy intensive Industries i_s, nfm, fmp, crp 
Other_transp Other transport otp 
Water_transp Water transport wtp 
Air_transp Air transport atp 
Oth_Ind_Se Other industries and services 
tex, wap, lea, lum, ppp, 
nmm, mvh, otn, ele, 
ome, omf, cns, trd, cmn, 
ofi, isr, obs, ros 
 












Code Hertel et al. (2007) Elasticity 
Weighted 
Std Dev 
Paddy_Rice PDR Paddy rice 10.1 4.0 
Wheat WHT Wheat 8.9 4.2 
CrGrains GRO Cereal grains nec 2.6 1.1 
Oilseeds OSD Oil seeds 4.9 0.8 
Sugar_Crop * C_B   5.4 1.8 
OthAgri PFB Plant-based fibers 
4.9 0.3 
 
V_F Vegetables, fruit, nuts 
  OCR Crops nec 
Forestry FOR Forestry  5.0 0.7 
Dairy_Farms * RMK Raw milk 7.3 2.4 
Ruminant CTL Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses 6.7 1.0 
 
WOL Wool, silk-worm cocoons  
NonRuminant OAP Animal products nec  2.6 0.3 
Proc_Dairy MIL Dairy products  7.3 0.8 
Proc_Rum CMT Bovine meat products  7.7 1.9 
Proc_NonRum OMT Meat products nec  8.8 0.9 
vol VOL Vegetable oils and fats  6.6 0.7 
Bev_Sug SGR Sugar  2.8 0.4 
 
B_T Beverages and tobacco products  
Proc_Rice PCR Processed rice  5.2 2.6 
Ofd OFD Food products nec  4.0 0.1 
OthPrimSect FSH Fishing  1.9 0.3 
 
OMN Minerals nec  
Coal COL Coal  6.1 2.4 
Oil OIL Oil  10.4 3.8 
Gas GAS Gas  33.0 14.3 
Oil_Pcts P_C Petroleum, coal products  4.2 1.1 
Electricity * ELY   5.6 1.8 
En_Int_Ind CRP Chemical, rubber, plastic products  
6.9 0.1 
 
I_S Ferrous metals  
 
NFM Metals nec  
  FMP Metal products  
Other_transp *     3.8 1.2 
Water_transp *     3.8 1.2 








Code Hertel et al. (2007) Elasticity 
Weighted 
Std Dev 
Air_transp +     3.8 1.2 
Oth_Ind_Se NMM Mineral products nec  
7.0 0.1 
 
TEX Textiles  
 
WAP Wearing apparel  
 
LEA Leather products  
 
LUM Wood products  
 
PPP Paper products, publishing  
 
MVH Motor vehicles and parts  
 
OTN Transport equipment nec  
 
ELE Electronic equipment  
 
OME Machinery and equipment nec  
  OMF Manufactures nec  
NTrdServices *     3.8 1.2 










Figure C 1 Changes in emissions from livestock sectors when EU implement 27$/tCO2eq emissions tax on all sectors and 








Figure C 2 Changes in Emissions from Crop Sectors when EU Implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax on All Sectors and 








Figure C 3 Output changes in livestock sectors when EU implement 27$/tCO2eq emissions tax on all sectors and sequestration 









Figure C 4 Output changes in cropping sectors when EU implement 27$/tCO2eq emissions tax on all sectors and sequestration 








Figure C 5 Changes in livestock sector trade balances when EU implement 27$/tCO2eq emissions tax on all sectors and 









Figure C 6 Changes in cropping sector trade balances when EU implement 27$/tCO2eq emissions tax on all sectors and 




Appendix D Tutorial about How to Introduce Emission-based Border Tax Adjustments  
The following steps describe modifications of the GTAP-AEZ-GHG database and 
model to introduce Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs). The calculation considers both 
direct and indirect emissions for separate regions (namely the D&I approach described in 
the Chapter 3).  
 
Step 1: Calculate emissions embodied in traded goods for each region and insert this new 
two dimensional data (trade commodity, region) into the base data file. 
 
Step 2: In the model,  
a) update the market price equation to link prices and BTAs 
b) update the regional income equation to return the BTA tax revenue to the 
regional household 
 
Step 1: Calculate embodied emissions of products 
 
1) introduce new variable output related emissions variable “cINDEMIT” with 
dimensions TRAD_COMM and REG. (See Golub et al. (2010) for the details.) 
 
2) In the command file, set the prices fixed (in order to convert the CGE model to a 
Input-Output model) and double the output of one sector in one region 
 
! Fix all prices so that convert the CGE model to a IO model 
swap tradeslack("Ruminants","USA") = qo("Ruminants","USA"); 
swap pm(ENDWM_COMM,REG) = endwslack(ENDWM_COMM,REG); 
swap pmes(ENDWS_COMM,PROD_COMM,REG) = sslack(ENDWS_COMM,PROD_COMM,REG); 
swap walraslack = pfactwld; 
swap u = incomeslack; 
 
!   shocks 
!   ------ 
shock qo("Ruminants","USA") = uniform 100; 
 
 
3)  Run this simulation for each sector and each region which makes (TRAD_COMM 
times REG) number of simulations 
 
4) For each simulation, the sum of cINDEMIT(i,r) (direct emissions from sector i in 
region r) over TRAD_COMM and REG is the embodied emissions for that 
commodity i in region r (the commodity and the region where you set in the 
command file). 
 
5) Bring those embodied emissions together and include them to the basedata with 
coefficient name: GLCA(TRAD_COMM, REG). 
a. Create a new header in the basedata with dimensions (TRAD_COMM, REG). 
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b. Copy and paste embodied emissions into this new header in the basedata. 
 
Step 2.a: Link Prices to BTAs 
 
The boarder carbon tax will show up as additional to tariff difference between 
VIMS and VIWS. Notations: UPPER CASE letters represent levels/coefficients and 
lower case represents percent change variables. Red variables are the ones need to be 
created in the TAB file. 
     SK, 
, T	 = SLU, 
, T	 ∗ VW + W 
  SK =  SLU ∗ VW + SLU ∗  VW +  W 
  SKSK =  SLU ∗ VW + SLU ∗  VW +  WSK  
  SKSK = VW ∗ SLU ∗ YZSK ∗ YZ ∗  SLUSLU + VW ∗ SLU ∗ YZSK ∗ YZ ∗  VWVW +




, T	 = G[\)[\) 	 
(# domestic price for good i supplied from r to region s #) 
 
• #, 
, T	 = G[6]^[6]^  
(# CIF world price of commodity i supplied from r to s #) 
 
• _"T, 
, T	 = G a`ba`b 	 , c 	_"T, 
, T	 = _", 
	 + _"T, 
, T	 
(# power of tax on import i supplied from r to s #) 
 
• Z_LKS, 
, T	 =  W 
(# carbon tax rate on imports #) 
 
• LK, 
, T	 = SK, 
, T	 ∗ YZ, 
, T	 




, T	 = VW ∗ SLU, 
, T	 ∗ YZ, 
, T	, VW = _"T, 
, T	 
(# carbon-tax-exclusive value of imports #) 
Thus, the equation becomes: 
#"T, 
, T	 = LK, 
, T	LK, 
, T	 ∗ e_"T, 




											+100 ∗ MMLKS, 
, T	LK, 




, T	 = g]\)86h,,i	g]\)h,,i	  
(# share of carbon-tax-exclusive value of imports #) 
 
• MMLKS, 
, T	  
(# total emissions for commodity i supplied from r to s #) 
MMLKS, 
, T	 = ZK5, 
, T	K, 
	 ∗ MMj, , 
		 
• MMLK, 
, T	 = R7R]\[h,,i	g]\)h,,i	  
(# emissions intensity of commodity i supplied from r to s #) 
 
Thus, the equation becomes: #"T, 
, T	 = LK, 
, T	 ∗ e_"T, 
, T	 + #, 
, T	f 																										+100 ∗ MMLK, 
, T	 ∗ Z_LKS, 
, T	 
 
These lines appear in the code as following: 
Variable (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG) 
    atms(i,r,s) # power of tax on import i supplied from r to s #; 
Equation TMSSHIFT (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG) 
    atms(i,r,s) = tm(i,s)+tms(i,r,s); 
Coefficient (ge 0) (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG) VIMSNC(i,r,s) 
    # carbon-tax-exclusive value of imports #; 
Update (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG) 
    VIMSNC(i,r,s) = atms(i,r,s)* pcif(i,r,s) * qxs(i,r,s); 
Read VIMSNC from file GTAPDATA header "VINC”; 
!define SHVIMSNC(i,r,s) = VIMSNC(i,r,s)/VIMS(i,r,s) ! 
Zerodivide (zero_by_zero) default 1; 
Coefficient (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG) SHVIMSNC(i,r,s)           
# share of carbon-tax-exclusive value of imports #; 
Formula (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG) 
    SHVIMSNC(i,r,s) = VIMSNC(i,r,s)/VIMS(i,r,s); 
Zerodivide (zero_by_zero) off; 
! GHGLCA(i,r) ! 
Coefficient(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG) GHGLCA(i,r); 
Read GHGLCA from file GTAPDATA header "GLCA"; 
!define GHGIMP(i,r,s) ! 
Coefficient(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG) 
    GHGIMP(i,r,s) # emissions from commodity i exported from r to s #; 
Formula (initial)(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG) 
    GHGIMP(i,r,s) = (VXMD(i,r,s) / VOM(i,r))*GHGLCA(i,r); 
Update (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG) 
    GHGIMP(i,r,s) = qxs(i,r,s); 
!define GHGVIMS(i,r,s) = (GHGIMP(i,r,s))/VIMS(i,r,s) ! 
Zerodivide (zero_by_zero) default 0; 
Coefficient (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG) 
    GHGVIMS(i,r,s) 
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    # emissions intensity of commodity i supplied from r to s #; 
Formula (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG) 
    GHGVIMS(i,r,s) = GHGIMP(i,r,s)/VIMS(i,r,s); 
Zerodivide (zero_by_zero) off; 
!Links prices and carbon tax rates ! 
Equation MKTPRICES 
# eq'n links domestic and world prices (HT 24) # 
(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG) 
    pms(i,r,s) = SHVIMSNC(i,r,s)*(atms(i,r,s) + pcif(i,r,s)) 
                +100*GHGVIMS(i,r,s)*NCTAX_IMP(i,r,s); 
 
 
Step2.b: Return BTA tax revenue to the Household in Abating Region 
 
Tax revenue = T*Q 
d(Tax revenue) = d(T*Q) 
  = T*dQ + Q*dT 
  = [T*Q/100]*[dQ/Q*100] + Q*dT 
  = [T*Q/100]*q + Q*dT 
where q = qxs (i,r,s) 
 Q = GHGIMP(i,r,s) 
 T = NCTAXLEV_IMP(i,r,s) 
 dT = NCTAX_IMP(i,r,s) 
Thus, the regional income equation will be updated as follows: 
 
Equation REGIONALINCOME 
# regional income = sum of primary factor income and indirect tax receipts # 
(all,s,REG) 
    INCOME(s) * y(s) 
        = FY(s) * fincome(s) 
        + 100.0 * INCOME(s) * del_indtaxr(s) 
        + INDTAX(s) * y(s) 
        + EMITQ(s) * NCTAXLEV(s) * emq(s) 
        + 100.0 * EMITQ(s) * NCTAXB(REGTOBLOC(s)) 
        +sum(i,TRAD_COMM, sum(r,REG,   
        GHGIMP(i,r,s)*NCTAXLEV_IMP(i,r,s)*qxs(i,r,s))) 
        + 100.0 *sum(i,TRAD_COMM, sum(r,REG,  
        GHGIMP(i,r,s)*NCTAX_IMP(i,r,s)))  
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